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It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine consid-
ering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out
and took their country away from them. They did not exist.




I am against my country's revolutionaries
Wounding a sheath of wheat
Against the child
any child
Carrying a hand grenade
I am against my sister
Feeling the muscle of a gun
Against it all
And yet
What can a prophet do, a prophetess,
When their eyes
Are made to drink
The sight of the raiders' hordes?
I am against boys becoming
heroes at ten
Against the tree flowering
explosives
Against branches becoming scaffolds
Against the rose-beds turning to trenches
Against it all
And yet
When fire cremates my friends








With the purpose of providing a context for the seventeen month
long Palestinian uprising, this Article traces the significant events in the
history of the conflict emphasizing the intolerable conditions imposed by
22 years of military rule. In the framework of international law, this
Article examines first the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
and second, Israel's institutionalized violation of the convention's gov-
erning standards which protect Palestinians living in the Occupied Terri-
tories. In addition, this Article discusses the Palestinian right to self-
determination as it relates to the application of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention and as an essential component of any comprehensive resolution.
Finally, Israeli laws and practices in the Occupied Territories will be crit-
ically analyzed in terms of their departure from the requirements im-
posed by international law.
The Question of Palestine was one of the first problems which con-
fronted the newly formed United Nations in 1947. Today the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict remains unresolved and further exacerbated. The
U.N. solution proposed a partition of Mandate Palestine into two sepa-
rate states. Now the state of Israel controls an area more than twice its
designated size under the U.N. plan.I The West Bank and Gaza though
1. See H. CATTAN, PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 75 (1973) [hereinafter PAL-
ESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW]. "The total area seized by Israel during the 1948 war
was 20,850 square kilometers, 26,323 representing the total area of Palestine. The United
Nations partition plan [see discussion infra at note 52] proposed 14,500 square kilometers for
the Jewish state and 11,800 square kilometers for the Arab state." Id. The remaining area
which included Jerusalem was to be an international zone. By 1949 Israel had seized control
of over 80% of former Palestine, as a result only 5,400 square kilometers remained of what was
proposed as the Arab state. In 1967 Israel gained control of the remaining Arab territory
making its control over the former area of Palestine 100%. In addition, Israel in 1967 took
over the Golan Heights of Syria and the Sinai Penninsula of Egypt. Neither of the latter two
territories were part of former Palestine. As part of the Camp David Accords Israel returned
the Sinai to Egypt in 1981. Presently Israel occupies the following: the land for both the
Jewish state, the Arab state, and Jerusalem under the United Nations partition plan, in addi-
tion to the Golan Heights. See also M. BENVENiSTI, THE WEST BANK DATA PROJECT RE-
PORT: DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, LEGAL, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
WEST BANK 73-97 (1987) (demographic and territorial maps) [hereinafter WEST BANK DATA
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under Israeli military occupation, are what remains of Palestinian land
not yet annexed by the State of Israeli.2
Currently the Israeli government is opposed to giving back any of
the occupied lands.3 However, because the Israeli government and the
majority of its citizens do not want the Israeli-Arab (non-Jewish) popula-
tion in Israel to increase by the 1.5 million Palestinians4 living in the
Occupied Territories,' the land has not been formally annexed. Laws
which protect Israeli citizens against arbitrary government action are
non-existent for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Furthermore
the military authority which governs in the Occupied Territories does
not abide by the international legal standards relative to civilians
presented by the Fourth Geneva Convention., Formal annexation would
create a dilemma for the Israelis: whether to grant full rights to a Pales-
PROJECT 1987]. See generally W.T. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER (1986).
2. Despite Israeli efforts to annex East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, virtually no
country has recognized these acts, as they violate the United Nations Charter Article 2 (4)
prohibition against the acquisition of territory through the use of force. Under international
law, acquisition of territory through the use of force is prohibited, whether the purpose is
offensive or defensive. The Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 47 prohibits the annexation of
occupied territory, explicitly providing that the Convention will continue to apply regardless
of annexation by the occupying power.
3. See Fundamental Policy Guidelines of the Government of Israel as Approved by the
Knesse 5 August 1981, reprinted in 10 (Y. Lukacs ed. 1984) [Hereinafter Fundamental Policy
Guidelines].
[It] means neither sovereignty nor self-determination... under no conditions will a
Palestinian state emerge .... At the end of the transition period set down in the
Camp David agreements, Israel will persent its claim, and act to realize its right of
sovereignty over Judea, Samaria [Israeli biblical names for the West Bank] and the
Gaza District.
Id at 107 (Israel's interpretation of Camp David accord).
4. See WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1987, supra note 1. Approximately 650,000 Pales-
tinians live within the State of Israel, while two million Palestinians live in exile. E. SAID, THE
QUESTION OF PALESTINE 115 (1979).
5. Though Israel gained territory by force in both 1948 and the 1967 wars, throughout
my paper the term "Occupied Territories" will refer only to the West Bank and Gaza. I focus
on the West Bank and Gaza because they have not yet been annexed to the State of Israel. In
addition the legal systems in both territories are characterized by military rule. Palestinian
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza live under a military administration which employs a
patchwork of laws whose origins range from the Ottoman Empire to the British Mandate. The
laws applied in the Occupied Territories differ markedly from the laws Israel applies to its own
citizens. Palestinians living in the territories have very little protection against arbitrary ac-
tions of the Israeli Military.
The majority of sources and examples deal with the West Bank rather than Gaza.
Though Gaza is one of the most densely populated areas in the world, it is less traveled and
relatively isolated, and there are far fewer studies available.
6. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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tinian which by the year 2010 may become a majority, or to continue
maintaining a system of apartheid.7 The Palestinian uprising has forced
Israeli society to confront the occupation head on, thereby obstructing
the historical process which began less than a century ago.
II. HISTORY OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
CONFLICT
A. The Balfour Declaration
In 1917, prior to the British mandate' the World Zionist Organiza-
tion9 and the British Government formally agreed to collaborate on the
establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.10 This agreement,
called the Balfour Declaration, was made without the consent of, or con-
sultation with, the Palestinians: Christians, Moslems, and Jews.11 The
Balfour Declaration of 1917 was a statement issued by the British gov-
ernment to the World Zionist Organization and has since been referred
to as one of the seminal documents leading to the establishment of the
state of Israel.12 The text of the Declaration reads:
Her Majesty's government view with favour the establishment in Pal-
estine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best
endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly
7. See WESr BANK DATA PROJECT 1987 supra note 1, at 5.
8. See discussion of British Mandate, infra at notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
Before and during World War II the British were present in Palestine to defeat Ottoman rule.
9. The World Zionist Organization was formed in 1897 in Basle, Switzerland at the First
Zionist Congress. The aim of Zionism is set forth in the following program established by the
First Zionist Congress:
1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agri-
cultural and industrial workers.
2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appro-
priate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each
country.
3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness,
4. Preparatory steps toward obtaining of such government consent, where neces-
sary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.
I N. SOKOLow, HISTORY OF ZIONISM (1919) at 268-69 [hereinafter ZIONISM].
10. See W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 18-78.
11. The term Palestinian in this context (prior to 1948) refers to all indigenous Arab
people living in Palestine or their descendants, including Christians, Moslems, and Jews.
12. This right [of the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own country] was recog-
nized in the Balfour Declaration of the 2nd of November, 1917, and re-affirmed in
the Mandate of the League of Nations which, in particular, gave international sanc-
tion to the historic connection between the Jewish people and Eretz-Israel and to the
right of the Jewish people to rebuild its National Home.
W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 18 (quoting 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL (authorized
translation) 3 (1948)).
[V/ol. 12
Palestine and Humanitarian Law
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil
and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or
the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. 3
This Declaration has been characterized by the state of Israel as
having significant legal bearing upon its claim to the territories of Man-
date Palestine.' 4 Yet the Balfour Declaration was made at a time when
the population of Palestine was approximately 700,000, only 56,000 of
whom were Jewish."5 Furthermore, the Declaration was made by a third
party (the British government) to another third party (the World Zionist
Organization), about the land of yet another (Palestine), without the con-
sent of the inhabitants (the Palestinians).1 6 The Declaration was made in
1917, five years before the League of Nations Mandate gave Britain ad-
ministrative control over Palestine. In 1922 the terms of the Declaration
were incorporated into the Mandate,1 7 again without the permission of
the Palestinians.
B. The British Mandate
The end of World War I marked the demise of the Ottoman Em-
pire 18 Palestine, one of the areas formerly under Ottoman rule, was allo-
cated to Britain by the League of Nations for administration under the
Mandate system.' 9 The Mandate system was established for "those colo-
nies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to
be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them."20
13. Balfour Declaration, Nov. 2, 1917, reprinted in W.T. MALUsoN, supra note 1, at 427,
app.2.
14. The term "Mandate Palestine" refers to Palestine as it existed under the League of
Nations Mandate. W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 63-69; see also id at 19 (significance
attached by Israel to Declaration).
15. H. CATTAN, PALESTINE, THE ARABS AND ISRAEL: THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 10-13
(1969) [hereinafter PALESTINE, THE ARABS AND ISRAEL.].
16. See PALESTINE AND INTERNATIOANL LAW, supra note 1, at 11-25 (critical analysis
of the Declaration and its legitimacy in international law).
17. W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 64 n.163 (citing 44 U.S. Stat. 2184 enacting the
convention between the United States and Great Britain which incorporated the text of the
Palestine Mandate).
18. Turkish rule ended in 1917-18 in Palestine as a result of the military occupation by
British and Allied forces during World War I. PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAV, supra
note 1, at 6.
19. The concept of international mandates was inspired by the principles propounded by
President Wilson and leaders of the Russian Revolution, that war settlements at the end of
World War I should not involve any annexation, but should be based on the principles of self-
determination of peoples. Id. at 25 (citing J. SCOTT, OFFICAL STATEMENTS OF WAR AIMS
AND PEACE PROPOSALS, December 1916-Novemeber 1918 188, 265, 309 (1921)).
20. LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovENANT art. 22, para. 1; see Advisory Opinion Regarding
South West Africa, 1950 LCJ. Reports 131.
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Great Britain was the mandatory power for Palestine from 1922 to 1948.
The two paramount principles of the Mandate system were nonan-
nexation, and the formation of a sacred trust of civilization, between the
League of Nations and the Mandatory Power for the well being and de-
velopment of the peoples of the mandate.21 The inhabitants of these ter-
ritories were thus the beneficiaries of this sacred trust. The terms of the
Mandate did not include any cession of territory or transfer of sover-
eignty to the Mandatory.22 Rather, the British Mandate was instituted
to foster the development of Palestine as an independent nation and to
render advice and assistance until Palestine was able to exist on its own.23
In an opinion determining the powers of a Mandatory under the
Mandate system, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that there
was no transfer of sovereignty from the administered country to the
mandatory power.24 Nevertheless it was under these circumstances that
the British, without the sovereign authority to do so, promised the land
of Palestine to the European based World Zionist Organization.
C. The King-Crane Commission
In 1919 President Wilson formed a United States government com-
mission, known as the King-Crane Commission, for the purpose of inves-
tigating the establishment of a Zionist state in Palestine. 25  The
Commission reported that to subject the inhabitants of Palestine to un-
limited immigration and to the establishment of a Jewish state would
constitute a gross violation of the right to self-determination. 26 The
21. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22.
22. 1950 I.C.J. Reports, at 132.
23. Id. "Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a
stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally
recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory
until such time as they are able to stand alone."
24. See Advisory Opinion Regarding South West Africa, 19.50 I.C.J. Advisory Opinions
and Orders 131. This opinion addresses the status of the territories of South West Africa
formerly administered by South Africa under a League of Nations mandate at the end of
World War I.
25. See W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 74-78; see also H. HOWARD, TE KING-CRANS
COMMISSION; AN AMERICAN INQUIRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1963). The findings of this
commission are significant in that they recommended against the establishment of a Jewish
state in Palestine because of the injustice it would visit upon the Palestinians and the violence it
would engender; nevertheless, the United States became a strong supporter of Zionism and the
State of Israel. See generally M. SHADID, THE UNITED STATS AND THE PALESTINIANS
(1981).
26. The King-Crane Commission recommended modification of the extreme Zionist pro-
gram for Palestine of unlimited immigration for Jews looking to make Palestine a distinctly
Jewish state.
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Commission relied in part upon the resolutions of the Arabs at the Gen-
eral Syrian Congress of July 6, 1919:
We oppose the pretensions of the Zionists to create a Jewish common-
wealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose
Zionist migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowl-
edge their title, but consider them a grave peril to our people from the
national, economical, and political points of view. Our Jewish compa-
triots shall enjoy our common rights and assume the common
responsibilities.2 7
The Commission recommended against unlimited Jewish immigration,
but in 1924 the United States, signed a convention with Britain approv-
ing British administration of Palestine.2"
In his address of July 4, 1918, President Wilson laid down the following principle as
one of the four great 'ends for which the associated peoples of the world were fight-
ing': 'The settlement of every question... [should be] upon the basis of the free
acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the
basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people....' If that
principle is to rule, and so the wishes of Palestine's population are to be decisive as to
what is to be done with Palestine, then it is to be remembered that the non-Jewish
population of Palestine-nearly nine-tenths of the whole-are emphatically against
the entire Zionist program.... To subject a people so minded to unlimited Jewish
immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would
be a gross violation of the principle just quoted .... No British officer, consulted by
the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist program could be carried out except by
force of arms.... [T]he initial claim.. . by Zionist representatives, that they have a
'right' to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be
seriously considered.
[1919] 12 of the FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNrrED STATES 793-94 (1947).
27. Id. at 793. At one time the levant area, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria com-
posed what used to be called Greater Syria.
28. See W.T. MALLiSON, supra note 1, at 64 n.163; see also 44 U.S. STAT. 2184 (text of
convention). Lord Balfour (the author of the aforementioned declaration) was also aware of
the injustice of the Zionist program. In a memo to the British Government he states:
The contradiction between the letter of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is
even more flagrant in the case of the "independent nation" of Palestine than in that
of the "independent nation" of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go
through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country,
though the American [King-Crane] Commission has been going through the form of
asking what they are. The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zion-
ism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present
needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of
the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.
In my opinion that is right. What I have never been able to understand is how it
can be harmonized with the declaration, the Covenant, or the instructions to the
Commission of Enquiry.
... In short, so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers have made no state-
ment of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at
least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate.
1989]
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D. Mass Immigration and the End of the Mandate
Despite Palestinian opposition immigration from Europe increased
under the British Mandate. By 1931 the Jewish population was 174,000
of a total population of 1,033,314.29 By 1946, immigration had increased
the Jewish population to almost one-third of the total population.3" Ap-
proximately 100,000, or one-sixth, of those Jews were native Palestinians
and they did not support Zionist Nationalism.31
By 1947, the British began to lose control over Mandate Palestine,
as Palestinian and Zionist national movements organized against the
British. As the violence intensified32 Britain requested the first Special
Session of the United Nations General Assembly to announce termina-
tion of the mandate.33 In response the United Nations formed a Special
Committee on Palestine to study the conflict. The Special Committee
proposed the partition of Palestine as a solution.
3 4
E. The United Nations Partition Plan
The United Nations Partition Plan (the Plan) divided Mandate Pal-
estine into two states: an Arab state and a Jewish state.35 The Plan allo-
cated fifty-seven percent of the land to the Jewish State,36 despite the fact
that Jews in Palestine comprised less than one-third of the population,
and owned less than six percent of the land.37 In addition, the vast ma-
jority of Jews were recent immigrants from Europe who did not have
i d at 77-78 (quoting DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939, First Series, vol.
4, at 340, 345 (1952)).
29. E. SAID, supra note 4, at 11 (citing statistics from Anglo-Palestine Publications, 1947-
1948 ANGLO-PALESTINE Y.B. 33).
30. Id. (by 1946 Jews had increased-to a population of 608,225 in a total population of
1,912,112).
31. W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 154; see also id. at 152 n.28.
32. See id. at 153 n.30 (quoting the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Report to the
United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the UK (1946)); see also [1947] 5
FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES 999-1328 (1971)(heading: Terrorism in Palestine,
Irgun Zvai Leumi, Stem Gang).
33. U.N. Doc. A/286.
34. This committee was named the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UN-
SCOP). See G.A. Res. 6, U.N. Doc. A/64, at 6 (1947); G.A. Res. 7, U.N. Doc. A/64, at 7.8
(1947); see generally G.A. Res. 181, U.N. Doe. A/519, at 131 (1947) (United Nations Parti-
tion Plan).
35. G.A. Res. 181, U.N. Doe. A/519, at 131-50 (1947) (text of Partition Plan); see also
THE ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT 907 (J. Moore ed. 1977). The Partition Plan, in addition to
providing for two states, assigned international status to Jerusalem. The plan provided for,
among other things, a joint currency system, freedom of transit, and a guarantee of equal
rights in civil, political, economic, and religious matters.
36. PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 55.
37. Id.
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Palestinian citizenship.38 The Arab majority, the indigenous inhabitants
comprising more than two-thirds of the population, strongly opposed the
Plan. The Arabs repeatedly requested that the United Nations Ad Hoc
Committee seek an advisory opinion regarding the legality of the Plan
from the International Court of Justice, but the Committee declined.3 9
General Assembly Resolution 181 (the Partition Plan) was passed
on November 29, 1947, ° despite the sentiments of the overwhelming
Arab majority.4 ' Following the United Nations vote on the Partition
Plan, the violence in Palestine escalated.42 From November 1947 until
May 1948 Palestine was plagued by civil war between the Zionists, who
favored partition, and the Arabs, who opposed the partition of their
country.43 It was amidst this violence that the British Mandate officially
expired on May 14, 1948. 4 The following day the State of Israel was
established by the Zionist Provisional State Council, (forerunner of the
Israeli Knesset) the World Zionist Movement, and the Jewish National
Council.
45
F. Creation of the State of Israel
As soon as the State of Israel was proclaimed on May 15, 1948, war
broke out between Israel and the Arab forces. 41 The 1948 war is referred
38. Id Approximately ninety percent of the Jewish population were immigrants, one-
third of whom had acquired Palestinian citizenship. Id. (quoting GOVERNMENT OF PALES-
TNE, STATISTcAL RsTRACTS 36.46 (1944-45)).
39. See PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 47-49. The Ad Hoc
Committee was formed in September 1947 to consider the Partition Plan and was composed of
all General Assembly members. See W.T. MALLIsON, supra note 1, at 159.
40. W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 160. The vote was as follows: thirty-three in favor,
thirteen against, and ten abstentions.
41. See PALESTINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 75-87 (discussing senti-
ments of Palestinian population). For the United Nations General Assembly to divide a state
against the will of the majority of its inhabitants, violates the principle of self-determination
and raises questions about the legitimacy of the act. However, for the purposes of this Article
the legitimacy of the Partition Plan will not be examined.
42. Khalidi, The A4rab Perspective, in THE END OF THE PALESTINE MANDATE 126 (W.
Louis & R. Stockey eds. 1986) [hereinafter END OF MANDATE]. One thousand, nine hundred
and seventy-four people have been killed by January 10, 1948.
43. Id at 132.
44. See generally id at 104-32 (detailing the period leading to the end of the Mandate).
45. See The Declaration of the State of Israel, reprinted in W.T. MALLsoN, LAWS OF
THE STATE OF ISRAEL 3 (1948); see also THE ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT, supra note 35, at 936
(Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel); THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER 125 (W.
Laquer ed. 1976).
46. Arab Troops were composed of combined forces from Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, see F.
KHouni, THE ARAn-ISRAELI DILEMMA (1968) (details of the 1948 war and the establishment
of Israel).
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to by the Israelis as the "war of independence." For the Palestinians,
however, the 1948 war represents the beginning of the diaspora and a
struggle to reclaim their homeland.
Arab forces from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria were joined under the
auspices of the Arab League in 1947. The Arab forces served as the
Palestinian army, fighting to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state
at the expense of the Palestinians. 7 The 1948 war resulted in the acqui-
sition of territory by the newly proclaimed State of Israel. By 1949, the
State of Israel, which according to the United Nations Partition Plan was
to comprise fifty-seven percent of the land of Mandate Palestine, con-
trolled eighty percent of Mandate Palestine. As a result, between
500,000 to 800,000 Palestinian refugees lost their homes in the areas
newly controlled by Israel.4"
At the outset of the 1948 war, Jordanian troops in cooperation with
the Arab League established control over the West :Bank.4 9 According to
a communication sent from the government of Jordan to the United Na-
tions, Jordan entered Palestine to protect "unarmed Arabs against mas-
sacres" and pledged to be "very considerate with the Jews in Palestine
while maintaining at the same time the full rights of the Arabs in Pales-
tine."5 The Egyptian government sent a similar message explaining its
presence in the Gaza Strip51 was to protect the Palestinian population
and "to restore 'security and order' to Palestine . . . until a just and
equitable solution is reached."5" Egypt and Jordan retained control over
Gaza and the West Bank until 1967. 53
47. Khalidi, supra note 42, at 123, 132.
48. E. SAID, supra note 4, at 45; see also id. at 14 (stating that 780,000 Palestinians were
dispossessed of their land in 1948). For information on the living conditions of Palestinians
who remained in the territory invaded by Israel in 1948, see generally S. JIRYIS, THE ARABS IN
ISRAEL 1948-1967 (1969); see also generally F. EL-ASMAR, To BE N ARAB IN ISRAEL (1975).
49. Cohen, The Zionist Perspective, in END OF MANDATE, supra note 50, at 95-95 (dis-
cussing 1947 collaboration between King Adbullah of Jordan and Golda Meir for the division
of Palestine between Israel and Jordan).
50. See Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samarla, 3
ISR. L. REv. 279, 283-84 (1968).
51. The true motives of the Egyptian and Jordanian Governments have been questioned
by Arabs and Israelis alike. Evidence of secret negotiations between Jordan and Israel indi.
cates that Jordan intended to gain control of the West Bank and expand its own territory
rather than protect the Palestinians. Khalidi, supra note 42, at 112-13. Jordan resolved to
annex the West Bank in 1950, but this plan was rejected by both the Arab states and the
international community. See Blum, supra note 50, at 289-90.
52. Blum, supra note 50, at 283-84.
53. The inhabitants of the West Bank were considered by Jordan to be Jordanian citizens.
The inhabitants of Gaza did not acquire Egyptian citizenship but were under Egyptian admin-
istration. E. SAID, supra note 4, at 136; see M. SHADID, supra note 33, at 44-47 (brief account
of the conditions of the Palestinians under Egyptian and Jordanin rule).
[Vol. 12
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G. 1967 Israeli Acquisition of the West Bank and Gaza
During the Six Day War in June of 1967,1 Israel gained control of
East Jerusalem, the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the
Gaza Strip." With the addition of these territories, Israel today is larger
than the whole of Mandate Palestine. Israel now encompasses the land
allocated for both the Jewish and the Arab states under the United Na-
tions Partition Plan, in addition to Jerusalem which was declared an in-
ternational zone, and the Golan Heights, a part of Syria. 6 The 1967 war
created another wave of Palestinian refugees, some becoming refugees for
the second time since 1947. 7 The West Bank and Gaza still remain,
after more than twenty years, under the control of the Israeli military.
International law which governs the treatment of civilians under occupa-
tion, particularly, the Fourth Geneva Convention, has failed to prevent
Israeli abuses, resulting for Palestinians in the denial of the most basic
human rights.
58
IMl. THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION
A. Rules of General Application
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 were created in the aftermath of
World War II out of a desire to prevent or at least minimize the atrocities
of war. 9 In general, they prescribe a minimum standard of protection
for civilians, prisoners of war, the sick, and wounded in the event of in-
terstate hostilities. The Geneva Conventions are international treaties
which have the binding effect of law upon those states who are signato-
ries. In addition, the Geneva Conventions are considered by many legal
scholars to be customary international law, binding on non-signatories as
54. See generally ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION OF JUNE 1967: AN ARAB PERSPEc-
V (L Abu-Lughod ed. 1970).
55. Id at 21. The Sinai was returned to Egypt in 1981 as part of the Camp David Ac-
cords. At the same time however, Israel announced the annexation of the Golan Heights (part
of Syria). Israel's annexation of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, however, has been unani-
mously rejected by the international community. Feinberg, The West Bank's Legal Status, 20
Naw OUTLOOK 60, (Oct.-Nov. 1977).
56. See PALESTIE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1.
57. W.T. MALLmoN, supra note 1, at 182.
58. See infra notes 128-285 and accompanying text (discussing Israeli Practice in the Oc-
cupied Territories).
59. Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (armed forces in the field); 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 89 (armed forces at sea); 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,75 U.N.T.S.
135 (prisoners of war); 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (civilians) [hereinaf-
ter Geneva Convention]; see also W.T. MALLISON, supra note I, at 175 n.2.
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well.6°
The Fourth Geneva Convention focuses on the protection of civil-
ians. Article 4 broadly defines the scope of persons to be protected under
the Convention: "those who, at a given moment and in any manner
whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the
hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are
not nationals.
61
The Fourth Geneva Convention also governs the belligerent occupa-
tion of territory. Article 6 provides:
The present Convention shall apply from the outset of any conflict or
occupation.... In the Case of occupied territory, the application of
the present Convention shall cease one year after the general close of
military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, for
the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises
the functions of government in such territory .... Protected persons
whose release, repatriation or re-establishment may take place after
such dates shall meanwhile continue to benefit by the present
Convention.
62
Article 1 provides that the "High Contracting Parties [HCP] under-
take to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all
circumstances." 6 This' article is significant not only because it binds a
party to act in accordance with the provisions, but also because it re-
quires a signatory to see that other states comply as well. Israel, as well
as the Arab states party to the conflict (Egypt, Syria, and Jordan) have
all signed and ratified the conventions."
The Israeli government, has not interpreted article 1 in this way; it
considers its obligation under the Fourth Geneva Convention to be inap-
plicable to its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.65 Israel claims
that when the Occupied Territories were seized in 1967, Egypt and Jor-
dan did not have legitimate claim to the land. It :is the Israeli position
60. See W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 261.
61. 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 4; see THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLIcT 434 (D. Schindler & 3.
Toman 2d ed. 1981).
62. 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 6; see also THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 61 at
435.
63. 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 1.
64. W.T. MALLSOiN, supra note 1, at 252.
65. On October 10, 1977, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan stated in a speech to the
United Nations General Assembly stated that the settlements were legal; the rationale used
was the following: "According to international law, the Israeli settlements in the admlnis-
trated [sic] areas are not illegal-in fact they are legal ... Jordan and Egypt had no legitimate
claim to sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza and that Israel cannot be considered an
occupying Power under the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention...."
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that the Territories belonged to no one, therefore Israel is not an occu-
pier.6 This argument, not only misconstrues the Convention, but it dis-
counts the legitimate rights of the Palestinians as civilians "in the hands
of a Party to the conflict... of which they are not nationals."6 7 Israel's
argument is framed in terms of an Israeli-Jordanian, Israeli-Egyptian
conflict which ignores the independent rights of the Palestinians. The
issue is more correctly framed as an Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but for
purposes of examining the Israeli argument, the conflict will here be
framed as Israeli-Jordanian.68
B. The Israeli Government's Position on the Application of the
Fourth Geneva Convention
1. The "Legitimate Sovereign"
Israel's analysis regarding Jordanian title and its bearing on the ap-
plicability of the Convention is seriously flawed. The Israeli Govern-
ment contends that in order for the Convention to apply Israel must have
displaced a "legitimate sovereign."69 Israel does not consider Jordan to
be the legitimate sovereign of the West Bank, and the same rationale is
applied with respect to Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Israel argues that Jor-
dan was at best a belligerent occupant and declares that Israel's title is
superior and therefore that of erga omnes over the territory.70 However,
there is no mention of a "legitimate sovereign" in the text of the
Convention.
The focus of the Convention is neither on the rights of the displaced
state nof its title to the territory, but rather on the basic provision of
66. See generally Blum, supra note 50, at 291-94.
67. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 59, art. 4; see W.T. MALULSON, supra note 1,
at 192.
68. The same arguments, vis-i-vis the Israeli-Jordanian characterization, apply to Israel's
characterization of the Gaza Strip with respect to Egypt.
69. Blum, supra note 50. Yehuda Blum, former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations
and representative of the Israeli Government in United States hearings on the colonization of
the occupied territories, in his Article, cites VoN GLAHN, THE OCCupATION OF ENEMtY TER-
RrroRY (1957) for the term "legitimate sovereign." However, the term does not appear either
in the text of the Convention or in the negotiating history. Von Glahn uses the term merely to
distinguish it from the occupying force. W.T. MALLION, supra note 1, at 255.
70. The Colonization of the West Bank Territories by Israel: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 33-35 (1977) (testimony of Yehuda Zui Blum, Prof. of Int'l Laws, Hebrew Univ.)
[hereinafter Colonization of the West Bank Territories]. ("Since... no state can make a legal
claim to Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] that is equal to that of Israel, this relative superi-
ority of Israel may be sufficient under international law to make Israel's possession of those
territories virtually indistinguishable from an absolute title to be valid erga omnes."). IM at
35.
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rights to the civilian population. The Israeli interpretation of the Con-
vention serves to frustrate the Convention's very purpose: the protection
of civilians-protected persons as defined in article 4 of the Convention.
Application of the Convention cannot depend upon Israel's recognition
of Jordan's claim to the West Bank, for conflicting claims to the same
land is the root of the conflict. It is the existence of armed conflict be-
tween party-states which invokes the Convention,7" and not mutual rec-
ognition of the legitimacy of their opposing claims. As one scholar notes,
if "humanitarian law were to be changed so that its application was made
contingent upon recognition by the belligerent occupant of the justness of
the war aims of its opponent, it is perfectly clear that humanitarian law
would be rarely, if ever, applied."' '72
Whether Jordan is the "legitimate sovereign" 'has no bearing on the
application of the Convention. Israel does not acknowledge that it took
control of these areas by force, in violation of the United Nations Char-
ter.73 Ironically the very reason that Israel alleges that Jordan is not the
"legitimate sovereign" of the West Bank is that Jordan established con-
trol by force. In an effort to disclaim any rights Jordan may have to the
West Bank, Israel asserts that because Jordan acquired the territory by
force, its claim is illegitimate. This allegation may or may not be true,
however it has no bearing on whether Palestinians living in the Territo-
ries should be protected under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Because
Palestinians are not nationals of Israel they are civilians protected under
article 4 of the Convention.
As set forth in article 2, the Convention applies to all cases of armed
conflict that may arise between the High Contracting Parties (HCP)7 4
The Convention also applies to all cases of partial or total occupation of
the territory of a HCP, even if the occupation meets with no armed
resistance.7" Nowhere is the application of the Convention conditioned
on the existence of a "legitimate sovereign." Finally, when one of the
parties to the conflict is not a signatory to the Convention, the HCP's
remain bound by the Convention in their mutual relations.76 Thus, re-
71. See 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 2.
72. Colonization of the West Bank Territories, supra note 70, at 51 (testimony of W.T.
Mallison, Prof. of Law and Dir. of the Int'l and Comp. Law Center Program, Geo. Wash.
Univ.).
73. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see 22 U.N. SCOR Res. 242 (Nov. 22, 1968) at 8-9,
reprinted in W.T. MALLisON, supra note 1, at 472 app. 21.
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gardless of the status of the Palestinians, Israel is bound to follow the
Convention because both Israel and Jordan are HCP's.
2. Israeli Claim of Title to the Occupied Territories
Professor Blum, Israel's permanent representative to the United Na-
tions, established the Israeli Government's legal argument:'
Israel can not be considered as an occupying power within the mean-
ing given to this term in international law in any part of the former
Palestine Mandate including Judea and Samaria [the West Bank]....
[A]s a result Israel's right to Judea and Samaria and Gaza are not
subject to the limitations imposed by international law on a belligerent
occupant.
78
Blum, however, considers Jordan to be a foreign occupant and therefore
precluded from acquiring sovereignty over the territories. Blum self-
servingly uses one standard for the Jordanian claim and another for the
Israeli claim.
Although Israel took the West Bank from Jordan, Israel insists that
it has a better sovereign title, superior to Jordan's. The Israeli Govern-
ment maintains that it did not acquire foreign sovereign territory but
rather that these territories somehow belonged to no one. 9 The Govern-
ment considers the Occupied Territories to be in essence unclaimed land,
left over from the time of the British Mandate. 0 It is on this basis that
Israel claims sovereign authority over the Occupied Territories.8"
The contention that the territories are not foreign to Israel, or that
they belong to no one, defies reality and the existence of 1.5 million
Palestinians.82 Although Israel claims that it is not a belligerent occu-
pant, the recent uprising is conclusive evidence to the contrary. The
presence of an indigenous Palestinian population and the hostility with
which they regard the Israeli occupation is indicative of the foreign na-
77. W.T. MALusoN, supra note 1, at 253-58; see Blum, supra note 50, at 279. (setting
forth the arguments now subscribed to, acted upon, and requested by the government of
Israel).
78. W.T. MALLSON, supra note 1, at 253.
79. See supra text at 1 (quoting Golda Meir); see also Blum, supra note at 50, 291-94.
80. Blum, supra note 50, at 291-94.
81. Just as it is contrary to the principles of self-determination and justice for the white
minority in South Africa to control and oppress the native Black majority and to determine
their destinies, it is equally contrary for the Israelis to declare sovereignty with respect to the
territories and to determine the future of the land and the Palestinians without the recognition
of their legitimate rights or their participation. The land in the Occupied Territories has been
inhabited throughout history by the Palestinians. Whether or not it has been realized, under
international law, the right of self-determination remains inalienable.
82. See supra text accompanying note 4.
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ture of the Israeli presence. In addition, Israel has not granted the Pales-
tinian inhabitants of the Occupied Territories civil or political rights
under Israeli law. Blum's distorted interpretation of the occupation con-
sciously ignores the rights and the legitimate claims of the Palestinians.
The Israeli Government position finds no support. in the international
community.83 Even the United States, which in most instances stands
behind Israel, voted against Israel at the United Nations on the question
of the legitimacy of the occupation and the application of the Fourth
Geneva Convention.8"
In fact, the United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly recog-
nized the legitimate claim of the Palestinians to sovereignty and self-de-
termination. 5 By contrast, it has been the policy of the Israeli
Government to deal with the Palestinians as refugees rather than as a
people with legitimate claims and rights guaranteed in international
law.86 Instead of addressing the conflict through bilateral negotiations
with the Palestinians, the Israelis have developed a policy of characteriz-
ing the issue in terms of third parties, notably Jordan or Egypt. This
attempt to find a resolution by way of third party agreements lacks the
legitimacy so essential to a lasting peace. Only recognition of the sover-
eignty of both the Palestinians and the Israelis will produce an enduring
solution.
C. The Role of Palestinian Self-Determination
1. The Right of Self-Determination
Self-determination is defined as the right of EL people to indepen-
dence, to maintain full legal, political, economic, social, and cultural sov-
ereignty. 7 Applied, this gives the Palestinians the right to govern
themselves free from the external influences of Israeli control. The issue
is not merely one of equal rights, but of the right of the Palestinians to
self-rule.
The principle of self-determination is well established in interna-
83. G.A. Res. 35/122, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 39-92, U.N. Doe A/35/48
(1980) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 35/122]; see W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 274.
84. See generally W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1.
85. The right to self-determination is guaranteed in the U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 and
General Assembly Resolutions 3236, 3070. G.A. Res. 3236, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at
4 (1974); G.A. Res. 3070, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 78 (1973).
86. GAOR 34/65B (taking note that the Camp David Accords were concluded outside
the United Nations framework, without the Palestinian Liberation Organization and rejecting
the Accords because they did not include respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian
people).
87. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1.
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tional law. Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights guarantees the right to self-determination for all people.8 8 The
United Nations Charter in Article I (para. 2) provides for respect among
nations based on the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples.8 9 The International Law Commission contends that the right to
self-determination is a peremptory norm.'
A United Nations study on the right to self-determination, holds
that the right attaches to "people under colonial and alien domina-
tion."91 A general consensus of the governments represented in the
United Nations, defines colonial or alien domination as any domination,
viewed as such, by the people concerned. The foreign occupation of a
territory constitutes an absolute denial of self-determination. 9 Con-
versely, colonial and alien domination does not exist where a people lives
freely and voluntarily under the legal order of a state.
93
The Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have been living under
the Israeli military authority for more than twenty years. 94 The laws
that protect Israeli citizens do not apply to the Palestinians. 95 The Pales-
tinians, by virtue of their nationality, are governed by a separate group of
laws and military orders.96 Under this separate system, Palestinians are
subject to land expropriation, deportation, house demolitions, detention
without charge, and prohibitions on free speech and free assembly, with-
out minimum due process protections.97 A systematic denial of basic
rights for a particular group of people results in the denial of self-deter-
mination.98 The daily protests in the West Bank and Gaza are indicative
of the tension produced by military rule. Over 430 Palestinians have
died since December 1987 in this rebellion against the occupation."
88. See The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 1.
89. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
90. U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1, at 10.
91. Iad.
92. Id. at 9.
93. Id.
94. R. SHEHADEH, OccUPIER's LAW 248 (1985).
95. See id at 212.
96. See id
97. See generally id
98. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1.
99. NY Times, Apr. 14, 1989, Al, col. 3. At least 393 Palestinians have been killed since
the uprising began. Id Al Fajr, Jerusalem, Apr. 10, 1989, p. 1, col. 1. Four hundred ninety-
five Palestinians have been killed since the uprising.
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2. The Right to Struggle for Self-Determination
The United Nations and the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
recognize that if a people denied the right of self-determination have
exhausted peaceful means, they have a legitimate :dght to armed strug-
gle, to achieve liberation from foreign dominance."0 0 The United Na-
tions General Assembly Resolution 2625 provides:
Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which de-
prives peoples ... of their right to self-determination and freedom and
independence .... In their actions against, and resistance to, such
forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determina-
tion, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accord-
ance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. The territory of
a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Char-
ter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State ad-
ministering it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter
shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Terri-
tory have exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with
the Charter.
101
The Geneva Conventions, as adopted in 1949, were made applicable
between "High Contracting Parties" or, in the case of Common Article
3, non-international conflicts. 0 2 Generally, in public international law,
only states have the capacity to contract. Thus, peoples struggling under
colonial rule were not protected by the Conventions.
The colonial wars and subsequent independence of many third
world countries during the 1950s and 1960s led to the promulgation of
the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions,103 which recog-
nized the need for laws dealing specifically with armed conflict in libera-
tion struggles. Under Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions,
100. See G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121-24, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970); G.A. Res. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 142-43, U.N. Doe. A/9030 (1973);
S.C. Res. 269, 24 U.N. SCOR (1497th mtg.) at 2, U.N. Do. S.!INF/24/Rev.1 (1969); S.C.
Res. 277, 25 U.N. SCOR (1535th mtg.) at 5, U.N. Do. 5/INF/25 (1970); S.C. Res. 282, 25
U.N. SCOR (1549th mtg.) at 12, U.N. Doe. 5/INF/25 (1970); see also Western Sahara Advi-
sory Opinion, 1975 I.CJ. Reports 1975, at 12; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Nambia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), I.C.J. Reports 1971, at 3 (Order No. 1 of 26 January 1971).
101. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR., Supp. (No. 28) at 124 U.N. Doe. A/8028 (1970);
see W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 194.
102. 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 75 U.N.T.S. 85; 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
103. See generally BOTHE & PARTS, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICT
(1982). The protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 were adapted
in 1977 to further the development of humanitarian law and adapt to the changing nature of
armed conflict, Le., guerrilla warfare, etc. Id. at 2.
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the struggle of a people for self-determination against foreign occupation
constitutes an international conflict.' ° 4 The Additional Protocol is sig-
nificant because it makes binding any agreement between states and non-
state entities such as national liberation movements.' 5 This also makes
customary laws dealing with armed conflict, which are incorporated into
the Protocols, applicable in this situation. 6 While the conflict in the
Occupied Territories is not characterized by conventional combat, it is a
struggle by the Palestinians for liberation against a foreign occupant.
Although Israel has not signed the Additional Protocols, there is a
general consensus that parts of the Conventions have become customary
law. 107 Therefore Israel is bound by the Geneva Conventions, both be-
cause of its relationship with Egypt and Jordan as signatories or HCP's,
and by its relationship to the Palestinians, who comprise a national liber-
ation movement. 10
D. The United Nations Position
The United Nations has consistently condemned the acquisition of
territory through the use of force."°9 Since the beginning of the Occupa-
tion in 1967, the Security Council has reiterated the inadmissibility of the
acquisition of territory by war and implored the withdrawal of Israeli
forces from these territories."10 The General Assembly has passed over
two hundred resolutions dealing with the question of Palestine; over fifty
concern the illegality of the Israeli presence and the construction of set-
tlements in the Occupied Territories."' On November 11, 1976, the Se-
curity Council issued a consensus statement reaffirming:
[Tihe Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War is applicable to the Arab territories occupied
104. Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Convention of 1949, U.N. Doe. A/32/144/An-
nex I, (in force Dec. 7, 1978)[hereinafter Protocol I].
105. See BoTHm & PARTs, supra note 103 art. 1, para. 4.
106. See W.T. MALLSON, supra note 1, at 400 n.437; see also TH LAws OF ARMa.%
CoNrLcT, supra note 61.
107. W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 400 n.437.
108. Some scholars consider all of the four Geneva Conventions to be binding customary
law. For purposes of this article I will not elaborate on which provisions are arguably custom-
ary and which are not. I believe it is clear for other reasons that Israel is bound by the Con-
vention. The argument based on the right of self-determination more correctly represents the
issues, but is by no means necessary to establish Israel's obligations under the Convention.
109. See G.A. Res. 35/122, supra note 83.
110. See W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 174-206; see generally 2 DocuMENTS ON T-m
ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICr (W. Wengler & J. Tittel eds. 1978).
111. UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CoNFLIcT
1947-1974 (G. Tomeh ed. 1975).
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by Israel since 1967. Therefore, the occupying power is called upon
once again to comply strictly with the provisions of that Convention
and to refrain from any measure that violates them. In this regard the
measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories that alter
their demographic composition or geographical nature and particu-
larly the establishment of settlements are accordingly strongly de-
plored. Such measures which have no legal validity and cannot
prejudice the outcome of the search for the establishment of peace con-
stitute an obstacle to peace. It considers once more that all legislative
and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including ex-
propriation of land and properties thereon and the transfer of popula-
tions which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem, are invalid
and cannot change that status, and urgently calls upon Israel once
more to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith
from taking any further action which tends to change the status of
Jerusalem.
112
In addition, the General Assembly has passed numerous resolutions
supporting the rights of the Palestinians. General Assembly Resolution
2535B recognizes the problem of the Palestinian refugees as originating
from the denial of their inalienable rights under the United Nations
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 113 The same
resolution expresses grave concern that:
The denial of their rights has been aggravated by the reported acts of
collective punishment, arbitrary detention, curfews, destruction of
homes, and property, deportation and other repressive acts against the
refugees and other inhabitants of the occupied territories, ... [and]
[r]equests the Security Council to take effective measures... to ensure
the implementation of these resolutions.
114
Resolution 2625 reinforces the principles of equal rights and self-determi-
nation of peoples and the duty of every state to promote realization of
these principles.115 More specifically, Resolution 3089D reaffirms the in-
alienable rights of the Palestinian people and their entitlement to equal
rights and self-determination, and expresses grave concern for the denial
of these rights by the State of Israel.'
1 6
General Assembly Resolution 3210 recognizes the Palestinian peo-
ple as a principal party to the question of Palestine, acknowledges the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) as the representative of the
112. The United States representative supported the issuance of this statement.
113. G.A. Res. 2535, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 30 at 25-26.
114. Id.
115. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28 at 121-24.
116. G.A. Res. 3089, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 30 at 26-28.
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Palestinian people, and invites the P.L.O. to observe and participate in
the meetings of the General Assembly concerning the question of Pales-
tine." 7 General Assembly Resolution 3236 calls on the Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations "to establish contacts with the Palestine
Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Pales-
tine.""'  The overwhelming consensus at the United Nations condemns
the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, reaffirms and calls for
application of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and supports the right to
self-determination and sovereignty for the Palestinians.' 19
E. The United States Position
The United States is a strong and generous supporter of the State of
Israel. Last year the United States gave six billion dollars in foreign aid
to Israel. 2 ° United States aid to Israel has climbed steadily over the past
twenty years. Despite its unyielding support, the United States has con-
sistently called for the application of the Geneva Conventions and Israeli
withdrawal from the Occupied Territories."' The following statement,
though made in 1957 by President Eisenhower, is particularly appropri-
ate today:
Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the
face of United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on
its own withdrawal? If we agree... then I fear we will have turned
back the clock of international order. We will in effect have counte-
nanced the use of force as a means of settling international differences
and through this gaining national advantage."
All United States administrations since 1967 have held Israeli settle-
ments in the Occupied Territories to be illegal under the Fourth Geneva
Conventions. 23 However, President Reagan at a news conference on
January 26, 1981, stated, "[a]s to the West Bank, I believe the settle-
117. G.A. Res. 3210, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31 at 3.
118. G.A. Res. 3236, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31 at 4, U.N. Doe. A/3236 (1974).
119. See W.T. MALLiSON, supra note 1, at 174-206; see generally 2 DocuMENTS ON THE
ARAB ISRAELI CoNFLICr, supra note 117.
120. The United States Congress allocated S3 billion in cash grants: S1.8 billion in foreign
military sales credits, and $1.2 billion in economic support fund grants. This accounts for
41.4% of these two foreign aid accounts in the 1988 budget. WASH. REP. MIDDLE E. An?.,
Feb. 1988, at 8.
121. See U.N. SCOR Res. 242 (Nov. 22, 1968) at 8-9.
122. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE BULL, vol. 36, no. 924, at 387, 389 (1957) (This statement was
in response to Israel's refusal to withdraw from the Suez Canal Zone.).
123. Cf U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HuidAN
RIGHTS PRACTCES FOR 1986, at 1184 (Joint Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter CouNTRY
REPORTS].
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ments there [are] not illegal. Not under the U.N. resolution that leaves
the West Bank open to all people-Arab and Israeli alike." '124 Later,
President Reagan changed his position, disapproving of the establish-
ment of any new settlements during the five year transitional period
under Camp David. 125 He stated that "further settlement activity is in
no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confi-
dence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negoti-
ated." 126 The Reagan Administration differed from past United States
administrations by not condeming Israeli settlement of the Occupied
Territories. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 calls for
Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories and is always pointed
to, by the United States Government, as a basis for the establishment of
peace in the region.
127
IV. ISRAELI PRAC1ICE IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES
A. Overview
Although Israel denies the mandatory obligation imposed by the
Fourth Geneva Convention with respect to the Occupied Territories, the
Government maintains that the Conventions are observed de facto never-
theless.1 28 The following section is a survey of some of the practices em-
ployed by the Israeli military authority in its administration of the
territories.
The Israeli Military Administration in the Occupied Territories en-
forces a mixture of laws from various legal systems including Turkish
law, British Emergency Regulations of 1945, Jordanian law (applicable
only in the West Bank), and Israeli Military Orders. These practices are
considered by the Israeli Government to comport with the provisions of
the Fourth Geneva Convention.
1 29
124. THE HOUSE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 1979-1982, at 228, quoted in J. PECK, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND
THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION 32 (1984). Reagan seems to be referring to the United Nations
Partition Plan which the United States Government has used since 1967 as a basis for settle-
ment. See generally M. SHADID, supra note 25, at 82-110.
125. See, PECK, supra note 124.
126. PECK, supra note 124, at 24.
127. See 22 U.N. SCOR Res. 242 (Nov. 22, 1968) at 8-9.
128. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at xiii, 43; see also M. BENIVENISTI, THE WEST BANK
DATA PROJECT: A SURVEY OF ISRAEL'S POLICIES 37 (1984) [hereinafter WEST BANK DATA
PROJECT 1984].
129. See Israeli Military Courts Sitting in Ramallah, Military Prosecutor v. Halil
Muhamad Mahmud Halil Bakhis, 47 I.L.R. 484 (1974) (June 10, 1968). ("The State of Israel
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1. Use of Turkish Law
Turkish laws are particularly important as they relate to the classifi-
cation of land. When Palestine was ruled by the Ottoman Empire, the
Turks applied their system of land classification. 30 Turkish law divided
land into three categories: private, collective, and state.' 3 ' The collective
land was referred to as miri and was cultivated and cared for by individu-
als who possessed the land but who did not hold legal title.'3 2 Until
1969, the Israelis used this form of classification as a remnant of the Ot-
toman rule. In 1969, a law was passed which declared that miri land was
to be considered private land.
33
In contrast, on the West Bank the military government considers
mir land to be state land and as such, subject to Israeli control."
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, the occupier is prohibited from
annexing any part of the occupied territory. 3 5 However, the occupier is
permitted usufructuary rights over the land and buildings belonging to
the displaced state.'36 The Israeli Government gains access to private
lands in the Occupied Territories by classifying them as public or state
lands and as a result, Palestinian landowners are displaced by Israeli set-
tlements. 137 Thus in the West Bank, miri is considered state land subject
to Israeli Government control and confiscation, while in Israel, miri is
is a state where the rule of law governs, and its military courts observe the provisions of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians.").
130. See R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 23; see also WEsr BANK DATA PROJEcr 1984,
supra note 128, at 32-35.
131. WESr BANK DATA PRoJEcr 1984, supra note 128, at 32-35.
132. Id
133. Land Law, 5729-1969, para. 153 (IRS); see R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 26.
134. See R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 26, 28.
135. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 59, art. 27.
136. The Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
art. 55, 36 Stat. 2277 (codification of customary law); see W.T. MALUSON, supra note 1, at
271.
137. See generally R. SKEHADEH, supra note 94, ch. 1; see also INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE
STuDrEs, THE ARABS UNDER ISRAEU OCCUPATION 1981, at 24-25 (1984):
Under Emergency Regulation Order 59, Palestinian land can arbitrarily be declared
'stateland' by the government and its use will revert to the military, landowners had
21 days to appeal to Israeli courts, a largely futile gesture which most Palestinian
landowners can not afford. Key to winning an appeal is proof of ownership through
land titles, most of which were issued under Ottoman rule. Records are often found
in Turkey, but this allows little time for them to be sent to a lawyer before expiration
of the appeal. Only 30 percent of West Bank land was registered during Jordanian
rule.
See also Jiryis, The Legal Structure for the Expropriation and Absorption of Arab Lands in
Israel, 2 J. PALEsTIE STUD. 4, at 82 (Summer 1973).
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considered private land.138
2. Use of British Emergency Regulations
The British Emergency Regulations were enacted in 1945 by the
British Mandate Government in response to the Palestinian and Zionist
rebellions. 139 These regulations, under the pretext of maintaining public
order and security, authorize a number of practices including demolition
and sealing-up of houses, deportation, and administrative detention
140
An example of Israel's employment of these Emergency Regulations is
the case of Muhammad Ali Al-Kal'ilah.
141
Muhammad is from the village of Samu'a near Hebron. His house
was demolished while he was arrested and sent to prison because of the
subversive activities his son was accused of participating in. Muham-
mad's son had not lived in the house for seven years.
Muhammad Ali A1-Kal'ilah's house in Samu'a had four rooms and a
138. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 26.
139. See E. SAID, supra note 4, at 36.
140. See British Defense Emergency Regulations (1945). These regulations will also be
referred to as the Emergency Regulations throughout the text of this Article. For example,
Regulation 112 allows the deportation of individuals for security reasons. Security reasons has
never been defined and as a result is subject to an extremely broad interpretation and applica.
tion. The use of the Emergency Regulations to deport Palestinians has been sanctioned by the
Israeli High Court in Abu Awad v. the Regional Commander of Judea and Samaria, HCI 97/
79, at 309 (1979). This decision is inconsistent with and in defiance of article 49 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention which prohibits deportations of the local population. Regulation 119(1)
permits the demolition of houses when there is any-
reason to believe that any firearm has been illegally discharged, or any bomb, grenade
or explosive or incendiary article illegally thrown [therefrom], . . , or of any house,
structure or land situated in any area, town, village, quarter or street the inhabitants
or some of the inhabitants of which he is satisfied have committed, or attempted to
commit, or abetted the commission of, or been accessories after the fact to the com-
mission of, any offence against these Regulations... the Military Commander may
destroy the house or the structure or anything in or on the house, the structure or the
land.
This provision is often used by the Military Administration as a justification for collective
punishment. In a report entitled "The Rule of Law in the Areas Administered by Israel,
1981," the Israeli National Section of the International Commission of Jurists attempts to
align this practice with that authorized in section 53 of the Geneva Conventions which prohib-
its the destruction of any property, private or public, except "where such destruction is ren-
dered absolutely necessary by military operations." But article 53 authorizes destruction only
where absolutely necessary and then it is only for the purposes of military operations. The
Military Authority is implementing Regulation 119 as a punitive meaure and not for military
operations. Order 87(a) as amended by the Israeli Military Authority authorizes the detention
of a person without charge or trial, for security reasons, for a period of six months. At the end
of six months the order may be reviewed and the detention renewed for another six months,
141. See Grossman, Report from Israel, The Yellow Wind-II, THE NEW YORKER MAO.,
Feb. 15, 1988, at 68 (a narrative written by an Israeli soldier).
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large garden.... One morning, soldiers came to the house and notified
her [Muhammad's wife] that she had fifteen minutes to get her daugh-
ters and all her belongings out of the house..... She and her two
daughters stood there and cried, while the soldiers knocked down the
house and spread its stones over the entire garden. Muhammad Ali
Al-Kal'ilah arrived after the destruction .... "Now they won't allow
me to build myself a new house," Al-Kal'ilah says. "They say, 'some-
one like you can't get a permit.' We live in a rented house-two
rooms, without a kitchen and without a bathroom. Eight people, to-
gether with my wife and my son's children, and we cook everything in
the bedroom."
142
Muhammad's attorney Lea Tsemel, a well-known Israeli human rights
activist, submitted several petitions to the authorities requesting an ex-
planation for the destruction of the Al-Kal'ilah's house. Several years
later the authorities responded: "The petitioner's son resided in the de-
stroyed house."143
The demolition of houses is practiced by the Israeli authorities in the
name of national security under Emergency Regulation 119(l).144 Emer-
gency Regulations are supplemented by Israeli military orders issued at
the discretion of the Israeli military commander. There is no judicial or
legislative review of these orders.
1 4 1
3. Use of Jordanian Law
Between the years 1948-1967, when Jordan governed the West
Bank, Jordanian law was extended to the area.'" Today Jordanian law
is applied by the Israeli military authorities, although Israel does not rec-
ognize the Jordanian claim to the West Bank. 4 7 Jordanian law is ap-
plied in a highly self-serving manner and not for the protection of the
local population as prescribed in the Geneva Convention.'48
For example, Jordanian law states that a parcel of land privately
owned which is not cultivated for three consecutive years shall revert to
142. Id. at 69-70.
143. Idk at 70.
144. See I.L; R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 154-56, 218-19, 240; COUNTRY REPoRTs
supra note 123, at 1188. See generally E. SAiD, supra note 4, at 14 (citing London Sunday
Times, June 19, 1977) By 1971, 16,212 houses had been destroyed.
145. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 87.
146. See id. at 64.
147. WEsT BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 34.
148. "Israel refuses to accept that the West Bank was under Jordanian sovereignty. Yet on
travel documents issued to Palestinians by the Israeli interior ministry the nationality of the
holder is declared as Jordanian. Still, Israel refuses to admit that the land upon which those
whom it recognizes as Jordanians live, is part of Jordan." K_ SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 13.
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the state. The military authorities, taking advantage of this law, will de-
clare a parcel of private land closed under Emergency Regulation 125.149
The land will then remain closed under that military order for three
years. Then because the land has not been cultivated, it will revert to the
Israeli Government under Jordanian law.150 The land is lost by the pri-
vate Palestinian landowner and is used for the construction of Israeli
settlements.151
B. Confiscation of Land
Articles 47 and 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibit the
annexation of occupied land as well as the transfer of an occupier's own
civilian population into the territory it occupies. 152- The Israeli Govern-
ment, through various means has obtained possession of almost sixty per-
cent of the land in the West Bank and over thirty-one percent of the land
in the Gaza Strip. 153 The great majority of this confiscated land is used
for the establishment of Israeli settlements.
154
Some of the laws used by the Israeli military authority to gain pos-
session of Palestinian land are briefly described below. The common jus-
tification employed throughout is that of "security."
' 155
1. "Closed" Areas
Emergency Regulation 125 is used by the military authorities to
149. Emergency Regulation 125 states:
A Military Commander may by order declare any area or place to be a closed area
for the purposes of these Regulations. Any person who, during any period in which
any such order is in force in relation to any area or place, enters or leaves that area or
place without a permit in writing issued by or on behalf of the Military Commander
shall be guilty of an offence against these Regulations.
Institute for Palestine Studies, The Karp Report 76 (1984). Regulation 125 has been used to
close a field outside a village near Nablus to prevent the sheep from grazing. Al FaJr, July 4,
1977 (Al Fajr is a Palestinian daily published in English in Jerusalem. It is banned from
distribution in the Occupied Territories.).
150. WESr BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 32-35. The land of Tego'a
settlement, was designated a military "closed" area (Orders 572 & 597 of 1975). On February
28, 1980 the area became state land. Id. at 35.
151. Id at 30-35.
152. 75 U.N.T.S. 287, arts. 47, 49.
153. WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 19, 32; see R. SI EHADEH, supra
note 94, at 213 ("[w]hile only 40 percent of the land has actually been registered for the exclu-
sive use of Jews, the land over which Israel has control approaches 60 percent (including
military zones, parks, and land expropriated but not registered.).")
154. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 213.
155. I use quotes for the term "security" because the term has become a blanket justifica.
tion for impermissible activity, and security as such is no longer definable as we understand it.
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close areas under the guise of security.156 These areas are closed and
then later requisitioned by the Israeli military authority. Shortly thereaf-
ter, the construction of Israeli settlements begins.157 Closed areas com-
prise over 1.11 million dunums, or fifty-three percent of the land seized
by Israel in the West Bank. 5 ' Compensation is sometimes offered,
although it is almost always rejected. 15 9 Palestinians refuse to accept
compensation because they do not want to lend legitimacy to what they
consider the theft of their land.
2. "Absentee" Property Law
The Absentee Property Law was enacted in 1967, soon after Israel
took control of the West Bank and Gaza." ° "Abandoned" property is
defined as "any property the legal owner or occupier of which left the
region on or before the appointed date [June 7, 1967] or subsequently
thereto."' 16  This definition may include property owners who left the
region to avoid the war, to travel on business, or attend college outside
the country or those who simply fled the region but did not leave the
country. The result is that Palestinians who were not in their homes for
whatever reason are considered absentee and thus lose control of their
land. Once property is declared "absentee," it is administered by a cus-
todian from the Israeli Government.
62
The usual practice of the Israeli Custodian of Absentee Property is
to lease the land to Israeli Jews 63 for the building of settlements.
164
"The Custodian [handles] 'abandoned' property as if he were an absolute
owner by transferring it, usually through forty-nine year leases, to third
parties for the establishment of Jewish settlements."1 65 According to one
estimate, the Custodian of Absentee Property controls a total of 430,000
156. See supra notes 154-162 and accompanying text.
157. See R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 37 (The largest settlement in the West Bank,
Kiryat Arba, was established in this manner.).
158. WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 23.
159. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 48.
160. Military Order 58 Concerning Abandoned Property, 23 July 1967, see R. SHEHADEH,
supra note 94, at 35; see WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 30.
161. Military Order 58 Concerning Abandoned Property, 23 July 1967, see P. SHEHADEH,
supra note 94, at 35.
162. See K. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 35-36 (detailing procedures of the Israeli Custo-
dian of Absentee Property).
163. The Israeli government permits only Israeli Jews to settle in the West Bank and Gaza
in the settlements.
164. KL SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 36.
165. Id.
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dunums (approximately 100,000 acres). 166 The practice of granting
forty-nine year leases to Israeli settlers who build permanent settlements
for Israeli Jews is not consistent with the declared policy of "protecting"
the property of those who fled from the region as a result of the war.
1 67
Four hundred ten thousand Palestinians were displaced in the 1967
war.168 As of 1977, only 48,000 had been permitted to return to their
homes. 169 Since 1948 the United Nations General Assembly has repeat-
edly voiced concern for the Palestine Arab Refugees and has strongly
urged Israel to honor their right to return to their homes and prop-
erty. 170 Israel has not done so and as a result of the Absentee Property
Law of 1967, many Palestinians unable to claim their property, lose their
land.
According to Israeli legal authorities, the Absentee Property Law is
Israel's attempt to comply with 'the duties imposed by international
law. 171 The Israeli Government maintains that the Custodian's purpose
is to protect the property of those who fled the region as a result of the
war. The 1967 Absentee Property Law states: "[s]hould the person who
was the owner or lawful occupier of the abandoned property return to
the region and prove his ownership in the property or his right to possess
it . . . the Custodian shall transfer the property or its value to
him .... , 172 The military administration maintains that the policy of the
Custodian has been to return the property when the absentee owner or
possessor resides in a country maintaining diplomatic relations with
Israel. 1 73 However, the above statement of policy is inconsistent with
actual practice. The experience of one Palestinian refugee attempting to
claim his property is illustrative:
A few weeks ago Mr. Shehade bought some property near Ramallah
from a cousin who has lived in Canada for years and is now a Cana-
dian citizen. He took the title documents of the Israeli military gov-
166. Id (quoting statistics from WEST BANK DATA PROjECr 1984), supra note 135, at
30).
167. See ISRAEL NAT'L SEC. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE AREAS
ADMINISTERED BY ISRAEL 48 (1981) [hereinafter RULE OF LAW IN ISRAEL]. Israeli jurists
contend that Israeli absentee property law was motivated by a concern for the protection of
those who fled the region. Id
168. PALESTINE, THE ARABS AND ISRAEL, supra note 15, at 107.
169. United Nations Relief and Works Agency was set up specifically to aid the Palestinlan
refugees from both the '48 war, when two-thirds of the population was displaced, and the '67
war, which displaced another half million, some who became refugees for the second time.
170. G.A Res. 3089(D), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 27, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973),
171. RULE OF LAW IN ISRAEL, supra note 167, at 48.
172. Military Order 58, see R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 35.
173. RULE OF LAW IN ISRAEL, supra note 167, at 49.
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ernment to register the transfer in the routine way. He was told that
the sale could not go through: the land had been taken over by the
custodian of "absentee property.".. . [W]ithin days, others around the
West Bank had similar experiences.
To treat all foreign-owned property in the West Bank as "absen-
tee," subject to the custodian, would have a very large impact. Resi-
dents of non-Arab countries are estimated to own 100,000 acres of
land [160 square miles] on the West Bank, and 11,000 houses .... 174
In another case, the custodian of absentee property took possession of
land belonging to a Palestinian, Mr. Albina, and transferred it to Israeli
settlers while Mr. Albina was still living in the area.175
3. "State" Land
As mentioned above, state land under the Geneva Conventions is to
be administered by the occupying power in the interim as a type of trust
for the displaced state. 176 Israel abuses its power in this respect by de-
claring private land to be state land, and thereby augmenting the per-
centage of land in its direct control. When the West Bank was under
Jordanian rule, approximately thirteen percent of the land was consid-
ered state land. 177 Today Israel has control of over sixty percent of the
West Bank as state land.17
When Israel occupied the area in 1967 the Jordanian Government
was in the process of registering the ownership of land. 17 9 Only one-
third of the land was registered by 1967.18° Two-thirds of the land in the
West Bank remains unregistered and land ownership is still categorized
according to Turkish law. 81 Palestinians who own land that is not regis-
tered have a difficult time establishing written proof of ownership when
challenged by the Israeli authorities. 82
174. Lewis, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1978.
175. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at n.25 (case of Francois Albina 16/82). The Objection
Committee to which an appeal was made, upheld the custodian's decision and allowed the
settlers to retain possession of the lands. Id
176. Id at 42. But see WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 37-39.
177. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 25 ( ". . .[A]pproximately 13 percent of the land in
the West Bank was in fact registered in the name of the state. This includes land which the
Jordanian government expropriated under the 'Law of Expropriation for Public Purposes' and
land which was acquired under the 1939 Emergency (Defence) Regulations" (footnotes
omitted).).
178. Id at 213.
179. Id at 22-23.
180. Id at 22.
181. See id at 23.
182. See id at 28-31.
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The Israelis have interpreted certain categories of land such as miri,
or land collectively owned, as stateJand. Furthermore, in 1979 the Likud
government declared virtually all unregistered lands to be state land 83
and, therefore, under Israeli control according to Military Order
Number 59.184 As such, Order No. 59 has facilitated the conversion of
more land in the West Bank for Jewish settlements than any other
method.
Once the authorities have declared property to be state land, the
burden falls upon those persons (Palestinians) claiming ownership to
prove otherwise.' The fact that the land is unregistered makes it diffi-
cult to offer acceptable proof of ownership. The Objection Committee
which hears these cases does not accept tax receipts or tax registration as
sufficient proof of ownership.' 86 If use is the basis of the owner's claim to
title, he must establish continuous cultivation for the preceding ten
years. 187 Establishing ownership to the satisfaction of the Objection
Committee is often impossible with these restrictions, and as a result,
Palestinians often lose their land."88 Relief from the Israeli High Court is
unavailable because it will not hear appeals concerning disputes over des-
ignated "state" land.8 9 Additionally, although the Objection Committee
183. The vast majority of land unregistered in the West Bank falls into one of three catcgo-
ries: miri, matruke, and mawat. The new policy declared all property falling into these cate-
gories to be state land. See id. at 28.
184. Issued by the Israeli military on July 31, 1967. This Order defines as state property:
all property belonging to the enemy state; all property belonging to a juridical body in which
the enemy state possessed any rights; and any property in which the enemy state held partner-
ship or possession. The Order stated one "appointed to implement the Order may assume
possession over state property and carry out whatever actions he deems necessary for this."
See id. at 26.
185. Id at 30 (Military Order 172).
186. Id at 31.
187. Proving ownership through cultivation is problematic also because in order to farm,
Palestinians need permission from the authorities to draw water. This permission is seldom
given and to depend on rain water as an alternative is very risky. Many Palestinian farmers
now work as day laborers in Israel proper. Id. at 31.
188. Even if an appellant succeeds in meeting the high standard of proof required by
the Objection Committee, the Committee may still decide against him. Article 5 of
Order Number 59 provides 'that every transaction made in good faith between the
Custodian and another person concerning property which the Custodian considered,
at the time of making the transaction, to be state property, shall not be cancelled and
shall continue to be binding even if it is proven that the property in question was not
state property at the time when the transaction was made.' The standard of proof
required to satisfy the Committee that the transaction was entered into by the Custo-
dian in good faith is not high.
Id.
189. In the Elon Moreh case heard by the Israeli High Court, it was declared that only
disputes regarding the use of private lands were within the jurisdiction of the Court. Id. at 21.
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has the power to issue injunctions to prohibit construction while the case
is being heard, it does not exercise this power. 19s Often settlement con-
struction has already begun by the time the case is heard. By 1985, most
of the land which had become available to the Israeli authorities under
this procedure, had been confiscated.1 9 '
4. Expropriation'92
The military in the West Bank has the authority to expropriate pri-
vately owned land on grounds of national security.19 3 A case in point:
In 1983, several thousand dunums of land were seized in Ramallah on
grounds of security. Some of these lands fall within the municipal ar-
eas of Ramallah and all are registered lands. The Army Camp for
which the military claim they need the land is situated far away from
the areas seized. This area borders on the industrial zone of the town.
Its seizure will restrict the town's development and the growth of its
industrial zone. The military made this seizure order knowing that the
High Court of Justice would be unwilling to accept a challenge to the
military order because of the Court's reluctance to question the mili-
tary claim... of security.1
94
Under an amendment to Military Order Number 59, "state" prop-
erty now includes "land that was or will be the subject of an expropria-
tion order."'" Expropriated land as such is then acquired by the Israeli
authorities and used for settlement. The Israelis describe the aforemen-
tioned practices as being in accordance with international law. In a
booklet published by Israeli jurists, international law is quoted as the
justification for these practices:
The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usu-
fructuary of public buildings, landed property ... belonging to the
hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard
the capital of such properties, and administer them in accordance with
the rules of usufruct [Article 55 of the Hague Convention of 1907]....
It should be emphasized that not merely does the occupant have a
right to take possession of government property and enjoy its usufruct,
190. In Case no. 17/83 before the Objections Committee settlers had begun the construc-
tion of two roads and a house on the property. The construction continued throughout the
hearing and at the time of reporting the outcome had not yet been decided. Id at 30.
191. Id at 31.
192. For a more exhaustive survey of land acquisition, see id; see also WEsT BANK DATA
PROJECT 1984, supra note 128.
193. WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 31.
194. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 31-32.
195. d at 32.
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but it has a duty so to do in order to safeguard the property, as pro-
vided in Article 55.196
Under even the most liberal of interpretations, the above described Is-
raeli practices can hardly be viewed as safeguarding the property for the
enemy state or its civilian inhabitants. The Israeli jurists condone the
confiscation of Palestinian land for military settlements to promote Is-
raeli security. Yet, Israeli Government sources indicate that existing set-
tlements are overwhelmingly civilian.
197
This elaborate network of laws must be examined in the context of
Israel's overall policy objectives. The Israeli policy of expansion and set-
tlement in the Occupied Territories parallels its policy of gradual expul-
sion of the Palestinians. Despite the appearance of legality, the law in
this case furthers the unlawful objective of transferring the ownership of
Palestinian land to the Israeli Government. Despite the appearance of
Israeli respect for the rule of law, the actual practice fosters injustice for
and exploitation of the Palestinians.
The Israeli authorities have now confiscated over one-half of the
land of the West Bank, and one-third of the land in the Gaza Strip. 198
The respective populations in the areas are: approximately 775,000
Palestinians and 55,000 Jewish settlers199 in the West Bank;2°° 650,000
Palestinians and 2,000 Jewish settlers in the Gaza Strip.21 In 1967 there
were no Jewish settlers living in these areas.
C. Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories
Articles 47 and 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibit the
annexation of occupied territory or the displacement of the local popula-
tion.20 2 Israeli land acquisition and settlement policies have grossly vio-
lated the letter and spirit of the Convention. Article 49 also prohibits the
transfer of the occupiers population into the occupied territory. 0 3 The
196. RULE OF LAW IN ISRAEL, supra note 167, at 43-44.
197. WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 49.
198. See R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 213.
199. The settlements are built for the use of Israeli Jews, for this reason I use the term
Jewish rather than Israeli, since Israeli Arab non-Jews are not permitted to live in the settle-
ments. See WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 34-35 (discussing Jewish
National Fund objectives to purchase land and safeguard the areas for Jewish settlement).
200. San Francisco Chron., Mar. 7, 1988, at A14, col. 1 (quoting United States State De-
partment figures).
201. Farshee, Gaza's Place in History, WASH. REP. ON MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS, Feb. 1988,
at 7 (Gaza is only a total of 143 square miles).
202. 75 U.N.T.S. 287, arts. 47, 49.
203. Id.; see also W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 263.
[Vol, 12
Palestine and Humanitarian Law
Israeli Government, however, does not regard the construction of settle-
ments as a violation of the Convention declaring that the settlements do
not displace the local population.2' The Israeli position maintains that
"[ilt is clear that the above article [article 49 of the Geneva Conventions]
does not prohibit the establishment of settlement, but that its purpose is
to protect the local population from deportation and displacement." °5
Additionally, the Israeli High Court of Justice held in Beit-El that the
construction of settlements for security reasons was permissible under
international law.'
Nevertheless, Israeli settlement policy is unanimously condemned
by the international community, regardless of whether the settlements
displace the local population." 7 The United Nations Security Council
has condemned the Israeli construction of settlements in the Occupied
Territories. Security Council Resolution 465 of March 1, 1980, states:
Strongly deploring the refusal by Israel to cooperate with the Commis-
sion.... Deploring the decision of the Government of Israel to offi-
cially support Israeli settlement in the Palestinian and other Arab
territories.... [The Security Council] [d]etermines that all measures
taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic compo-
sition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other
Arab territories occupied since 1967 including Jerusalem, or any part
thereof, have no legal validity and that Israel's policy and practices of
settling parts of its population and new immigrants in those territories
constitute a flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also
constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and
lasting peace in the Middle East. ... [The Council] [c]alls upon all
states not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in
204. See W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 263-65.
205. RULE OF LAW IN IsRAEL, supra note 167, at 54.
206. Suleiman Ayoub v. Minister of Defense, 606178 P.D. 33(2)113; see also R. SHEHADEH
supra note 94, at 97 ("In Belt-El, judges accepted the claim that private Arab land confiscated
to erect a civilian Jewish settlement was taken for 'security purposes.' In the Rafiah case,
Justice Vitk6m stated that 'security matters, like matters of foreign policy, are not justiciable'
and that actions of the military authorities will not be questioned if the court is satisfied that
they were based on security grounds.").
207. S.C. Res. 242, 11/22/67 U.N. SCOR 22nd year at 89. United Nations Security Coun-
cil Resolution 242 emphasizes the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, and
calls for Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. S.C. Res. 465 U.N. SCOR 35th
year at 5. Security Council Resolution 465 again reaffirms the applicability of the Fourth
Geneva Conventions to the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, and
deplores the Israeli policy of settlements in the Palestinian and Arab territories. The General
Assembly annually condemns the confiscation of land and the construction of Israeli
settlements.
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connection with settlements in the occupied territories.2 °8
Even if the true intent of the Conventions were as the Israeli Gov-
ernment declares, to prevent displacement of the local population, it is
only logical that confiscation of a large percentage of the land results in
the displacement of many Palestinians. A large number of Palestinians
have lost their land, but Israeli jurists continue to argue that "Arab in-
habitants have not been displaced by Israeli settlements. ' 20 9
1. The Drobles Plan
210
Since 1967 no census has been taken in the Occupied Territories.21
The Palestinian population in 1986 was estimated to be 835,000 in the
West Bank and approximately 542,000 in Gaza.212 The Drobles Plan,
created by members of the Israeli Government and the World Zionist
Organization, anticipates the settlement of 600,000 to 800,000 Jews in
the Occupied Territories by the year 2010.213 The design contemplates:
a strip of settlements at strategic sites [to] enhance both internal and
external security... as well as making concrete our right to Eretz
Israel... [s]ettlement must be carried out not only around the settle-
ments of the minorities but also in between them, this is in accordance
with the settlement policy adopted in the Galilee and other parts of the
country.214
The principles of the Drobles Plan described by the former Deputy
Mayor of Jerusalem, Meron Benvenisti, are "political directives ex-
pressed in professional planning jargon. ' 215 The criterion established to
determine priorities of settlement regions are: "interconnection (havirah)
208. The United States Congress allocated $3 billion in cash grants: $1.8 billion in foreign
military sales credits, and $1.2 billion in economic support fund grants. This accounts for
41.4% of these two foreign aid accounts in the 1988 budget. WASH. REP. MIDDLE E. AFV.,
Feb. 1988, at 8.
209. RULE OF LAW IN ISRAEL, supra note 167, at 55.
210. WEsT BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 28. The Drobles Plan, though
not official state policy, was devised by a team of representatives from the Ministries of
Defense, the Interior, Housing, and special agencies such as Land Authority, Public Works,
Electric Corporation, etc. "The plan is based on surveys and plans and quotes the ministerial
committee's decision. It cannot be viewed as other than the official land use plan for the West
Bank." Id
211. Id at 1.
212. See WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1987, supra note 1; see WASH. REP. MIDDLE E.
AFF., Feb. 1988, for estimates of 887,000 and 650,000 in the West Bank and Gaza respectively,
213. Cf The Master Plan for the Development of Settlement in Judea and Samaria 1979-
1983, U.N. SCOR Supp. (Oct.-Dec. 1979) at 19, U.N. Doc. S/13582 (1979).
214. Id.
215. WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 27.
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between existing Jewish areas for the creation of (Jewish) 'settlement
continuity', and 'separation' (hayitz) to restrict uncontrolled Arab settle-
ment... blocks." '216 The Drobles Plan seeks to check the growth of
Arab towns and villages, while expanding the possibility for Jewish set-
tlement, thereby promoting the interests of the occupier's population
over those of the local population.
The Israeli Government provides special tax exemptions, inexpen-
sive loans, and direct subsidies217 to encourage Israelis to live in the set-
tlements and assume the role of settler.218 The United States Country
Reports on Human Rights for Israel confirms that:
Israeli settlements receive large annual subsidies in various forms from
the government of Israel and Israelis receive inducements to take up
residence in the settlements. Indigenous Palestinians have not been
offered the use of land under Israeli control on the same basis as Israeli
settlers, nor have they received special assistance.., to encourage
them to remain in the territory.2
A Palestinian human rights attorney, Raja Shehadeh, explains how
he views Israeli settlement policy:
[Tihe basic overriding objective of the settlement of Jews in the West
Bank... is to drive out Palestinians and annex the area when the
demographic balance has changed. Instrumental to this objective is
the break-up of the demographic continuity of the land inhabited by
West Bank Palestinians in order to render unfeasible the establishment
there of a Palestinian state.220
2. The Establishment of Dual Societies
The establishment of Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories
has created a system of apartheid. The laws of the military administra-
tion apply to the Palestinians while Israelis are governed by the laws of
Israel. 2 Previously, the Government distinguished between Israelis and
216. Id at 27 (quoting Master Plan and Development for Settlement in Samaria and Judea
(Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, Ministry of Agriculture, April 1983), sec. 2.1.3).
217. Id at 60.
218. Id at 55-63.
219. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 123, at 1194.
220. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 6-7.
221. Id at 6-7.
[The status which Israel has accorded to the Palestinians in the West Bank is that of
permanent alien residents. The Israeli settlers on the other hand enjoy full Israeli
citizenship and are spared the disadvantages suffered by the Palestinians in being
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Palestinians by jurisdiction according to geographic area.222 Presently,
jurisdiction attaches according to nationality.22 a Israeli laws were ex-
tended not to the Occupied Territories but to the Jewish settlers living
there:224 "[all rights and benefits of Israeli law and services will be in
effect in the 'Jewish areas.' "225 "The Arab areas will remain under dom-
subject to the local law, namely the remnants of Jordanian law as amended by over
1,100 Military Orders now in force.
Israeli residents in the Occupied Territories are subject to Israeli law which has
been applied to them by using emergency regulations to extend Israeli legislation to
the settlers, by issuing Military Orders which are applicable only to the Jewish settle-
ments, and by distinguishing the local government units of the Jewish settlements
called local and regional councils, from the Palestinians' local government units of
village councils and municipal councils. Thus any Military Order which applies to
local and regional councils will apply only to the Jewish residents of the West Bank
and orders applicable to the village councils and the municipal councils will apply
only to the Palestinians.
Id.; see also WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 39-40 (describing Military
Orders 783 and 982).
222. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94 at 64,
The law that applied to the West Bank when Israel occupied it in 1967 was Jordanian
law. The Jordanian courts had sole jurisdiction over all residents of the West Bank
in civil and criminal matters.., by 1979 the number of Jews living in the West Bank
was only 10,000. These settlers were all Israeli citizens... [t]herefore in terms of the
law in force in the West Bank, they were considered foreigners .... In criminal
matters the Military Orders stated that military courts should have concurrent juris-
diction with the local Jordanian courts.... The choice as to which court a criminal
suit should be heard in was reserved to the Area Commander. The Jewish settlers
were therefore immune from the local courts in criminal matters but not in civil suits.
The practice of the government towards the Jewish settlers was preferential and vio-
lations of the law were overlooked to facilitate the settlers' life in a legal situation
which did not always work to their best interest.... In March 1979 Prime Minister
Begin said, 'The Jewish inhabitants of Judea and Samaria and Gaza will be subject to
the laws of Israel.'
Id.; See also WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 39-47. Under Military
Order 848, areas seized for military purposes and state lands were added to the jurisdictional
boundaries to which Israeli law applied. Id. at 40.
223. CoUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 123, at 1193 (With regard to "due process, acquisi-
tion and loss of residency, freedom of movement, land use, and access to social services, Pales-
iinians... are treated differently, and usually less favorably than Jewish settlers in the same
areas."0).
224. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 124.
225. WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 42.
Israeli primary legislation concerning Jewish enclaves ard personal status of set-
tlers is based on laws enacted in the Knesset, and on military orders enacted by the
Military Commander which copy verbatim Israeli legislation. A tangled system of
secondary legislation, regulations, "announcements" and extra-legal arrangements
have ensured that Israeli settlers moving to the occupied territories carry with them
their personal and communal status. Although they have, in a legal sense, settled
outside the borders of Israel and are subject to West Bank law (Jordanian law and
security enactments) [sic].
Thus, in a series of laws and emergency regulations, the Knesset has established
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ination of Israeli military authority." 6 On a broad range of issues, in-
cluding the right to due process, acquisition, and loss of residency,
freedom of movement, freedom of expression, land use, and access to
social services, Palestinians are treated very differently.227
In addition to the injustice created by two separate sets of laws in
the Occupied Territories, the law (of either jurisdiction) is seldom en-
forced when it comes to Jewish settler violence against Palestinians in the
Occupied Territories." 2 There is a great deal of hostility between the
settlers and the Palestinians, exacerbated by the fact that settlers are
often armed. Tensions are high and violence between the two popula-
tions is not unusual. In a Government inquiry by Israeli Deputy Attor-
ney General Yehudit Karp, incidents of settler violence against
Palestinians were investigated." 9 From the Karp inquiry it was reported
that in the majority of cases neither the army nor the civilian police
would follow up an incident with any investigation. 3 The Karp Re-
port231 is an indictment of Israel's failure to administer justice equally in
the Occupied Territories. Acts committed by settlers against Palestini-
ans not only go unpunished, but are not even investigated by the
authorities.
Because of the extent of settlement in the Occupied Territories, it
appears that these incidents will only increase. As of 1983 there were a
that for the purpose of certain basic laws Israelis or those entitled to Israeli citizen-
ship through the Law of Return (.e. Jews), would be viewed as residents of Israel.
Orders 783 (March 1979) and 892 (March 1981) stipulate that the IDF com-
mander in the area is empowered to determine by regulations, guidelines for manag-
ing regional councils, and to establish directives concerning powers and
administrative arrangements concerning the management of the affairs of 'residents
of the councils'. For that purpose, the commander is empowered to establish a court
for local affairs whose jurisdiction, and the laws by which it adjudicates will be deter-
mined in regulations (Articles 2, A, B).
Based on that "primary" legislation, detailed "regulations", copying almost ver-
batim Israeli local authorities ordinances have been issued. Thus, Israeli municipal
laws have been introduced to the West Bank and apply only to Jewish enclaves,
disguised as routine Military Government secondary legislation and signed by a low
level 'official responsible'.
WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1987, supra note 1, at 37-38.
226. WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 104.
227. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 123, at 1185, 1193.
228. See INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES, supra note 137, 20, 22.
229. Id.
230. Id at 39, 42.
231. See id. Though the Karp Commission had concluded its investigation in 1982, be-
cause of the great controversy caused by the findings in the repor, it was not released by the
government until 1984. Yehudit Karp resigned from her position as deputy attorney general
as a result of the government handling of this matter. Id. at vi.
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total of 106 Jewish settlements, 98 in the West Bank and 8 in Gaza. All
were less than half full, indicating that the settlements were not built for
security, or to supply needed housing, but to make permanent Israeli
expansion into the Occupied Territories by de facto annexation.232 There
has been a flurry of settlement activity in recent years which exhibits a
gross disregard both for international law and the Camp David Ac-
cords.233 Construction of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories
continues to increase annually.23 a
D. The Right to Return
In Israel the law of return (the right to immigrate) applies to Jews
everywhere in the world. "Every Jew has the right to come to this coun-
try as a Jewish immigrant. ' 235 The right of a person to return to his or
her country of origin is well established in customary international law.
As evidenced by state practice, the law applies to civilians, prisoners of
war, disabled military personnel, and others.236 The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights in Article 13(2) provides "everyone has the right
to leave any country including his own and to retum to his country.1237
The International Covenant on Civil and Political )Rights states "no one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
238
232. See generally WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 37.
The accession to power of the Likud government in 1977 created a new situation.
Ideologically, it could not have accepted even the implied admission that the territo-
ries are "occupied". Permanent control over the land of Israel is axiomatic for
government officials. The motive and purpose of their policies has been to attain that
end. The actions of the military administration have been aimed, under Likud, at
making Israel's control permanent.
Id. at 38.
233. Id. at 39.
It was precisely to dictate the outcome of the autonomy talks [referring to Camp
David] that the military government, guided by various ministerial committees and
expert commissions, took a series of legal and physical actions simultaneously with
the autonomy talks (1979-1981). The following actions (among others) were taken:
survey of unregistered land, the approval of the new definition for state land and the
first "declarations"; massive deployment of Israeli forces and construction of infra-
structure; massive settlement; transfer of responsibility over water resources from the
military government to the National Water Company... , etc.
234. WEsr BANK DATA PROJECT 1987, supra note 1, at 55, 57. ("By 1987 there were 118
settlements on the West Bank as compared with 109 in 1984. The main settlement construc-
tion activity, however, occurred in [already] existing settlements.") Id. at 55.
235. 4 Israel Laws 114.
236. W.T. MALLISON, supra note 1, at 175.
237. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810, at 74 (1948).
238. G.A. Res. 2200, art 12(4), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 54, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
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There are presently close to two million Palestinians living outside
of Israel. 39 Out of 410,000 Palestinians displaced during the 1967 war,
only 14,000 have been permitted to return.?' General Assembly Resolu-
tion 3236(2) reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinians to return
to their homes and property from which they were displaced.241 General
Assembly Resolution 31/15A notes with regret that neither repatriation
nor compensation has yet been achieved for the 1948 refugees.24
Palestinians who were born in what is now Israel and in the Occu-
pied Territories are not permitted to return to that area to live, while
Jews from any country in the world, who perhaps have never been to
Israel, are guaranteed citizenship under Israeli law. In addition, Israel
often refuses to renew the laissez-passer (travel documents which serve as
passports) of West Bank residents who study or work abroad, declaring
that they have abandoned their residence even though they have not ac-
quired foreign citizenship.243 As a result these Palestinians become state-
less and are only permitted to return as tourists if they are able to obtain
a visa.244
Entry permits and residency rights are often denied to spouses and
children of Palestinians solely because the head of household has emi-
grated.2 45 Israel also has not permitted the return of many former West
Bank residents who were not present in the territory when the 1967 cen-
sus was taken regardless of the reason for their absence.246 In the sum-
mer of 1986, approximately 100 American citizens of Palestinian origin
visiting the Occupied Territories, had their passports impounded, were
given visas of shorter duration than normal, and many were made to post
bonds of two to three thousand dollars.2 4 7 The Israelis have deported
more than 1,200 Palestinians from the Occupied Territories in violation
of Article 49(1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the
individual, mass transfer or deportation of protected persons from the
239. E. SAm, supra note 4, at 115.
240. PALESTINF, THE ARABs AND ISRAEL, supra note 15, at 114 n. 150.
241. 29 GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 4, U.N. Doe. A/9631(1975); see W.T. MALUsIOiN, supra
note 1, at 184.
242. 31 GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 48, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977); see W.T. MALLISON,
supra note 1, at 186.
243. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 123, at 1179, 1192.
244. See R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 115.
245. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 123, at 1192.
246. L SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 28. There has been no census taken in the Occupied
Territories since 1967. WEsT BANK DATA PROjECT 1984, supra note 128, at 1; see PALES-
TmT, THE ARAns AND ISRAEL, supra note 15, at 52-53.
247. Coumn-RY REPORTS, supra note 123, at 1194.
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occupied land regardless of motive.24 These deportations were carried
out in contravention of international law, and amidst protest by the
United Nations, including the Security Council.249
The denial of the right to return and deportations, combined with
the confiscation of land and the construction of Jewish settlements,
serves the purpose of diminishing the Palestinian presence in the occu-
pied lands. In addition, the restrictions which govern the Palestinians
living under military occupation have made life intolerable, and some
have chosen to leave.
E. Security Offenses250
In order to understand Israeli practice in the West Bank and Gaza,
it is essential to examine the concept of "security" because it is the ra-
tionale used to justify Israel's actions against the Palestinian popula-
tion.251 Under international law the occupier is permitted to impose
limited restrictions on the local population, necessary for the security of
its army.2 52 Israel has relied on this security provisions to defend its prac-
tices in the West Bank and Gaza; however, the concept has become' so
far-reaching that it encompasses virtually anything.253 There is no pre-
248. See also, San Francisco Chron., Apr. 20, 1988, at Al.
249. Id
250. F. LANGER, WITH MY OwN EYES (1975); NA7IONAL LAWYERS GUILD,
TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS IN ISRAELI OCCUPIED WEST BANK AND GAZA (1978). See
generally R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94 (comprehensive survey of Israeli human rights abuses
in the Occupied Territories).
251. Palestinians in the West Bank do not enjoy the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest.
Israeli soldiers have the power to search premises and arrest without a warrant under Military
Order 378. "It is estimated that 200,000 security prisoners and detainees (20% of the popula-
tion) have passed through Israeli prisons." R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 141.
252. Id at 107-09 (referring to the Hague Regulations of October 18, 1907).
253. The official Israeli view is that Israeli civilians' presence in the occupied territo-
ries is necessary for security .... Widening the scope of the notion of security to this
extent makes it irreconcilable with the law of belligerent occupation .... If the pres-
ence of civilians of the occupying power in occupied territories is necessary for the
security of the occupier then all the actions taken to support this presence will be
legitimized, including the acquisition of land and natural resources and the construc-
tion of an infrastructure to support that presence, [referring to the presence of civil-
ians of the occupier i.e. Israeli Settlers] regardless of the extent to which the occupied
people are thereby deprived of their legal rights and property.
It follows further that actions taken to suppress the development of the inhabit-
ants of the occupied territories and to encourage them to leave will also be legally
excusable as necessary for the security of the occupying power since those inhabit-
ants will necessarily be hostile to the settler policy.
Id at 110. Therefore the Israeli manipulation of the meaning of 'civilian' (taken from the
Fourth Geneva Convention) results in the application of Humanitarian law to the occupier's
settler population, rather than to the intended civilian population under occupation.
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cise definition of security or security offenses under Israeli law.' Arabs
suspected of security offenses are tried in military courts." Most mili-
tary trials are public except for cases involving serious security offenses.
Nevertheless many trials involve the use of secret evidence which neither
the accused nor his attorney can see. 56 Military court verdicts cannot be
appealed to the Israeli High Court except on procedural grounds, 57 and
even then appeal is not a remedy for institutionalized pre-trial abuse.
Prior to trial or arrest, Israeli law allows authorities to administra-
tively detain Palestinians, suspected of a security offense, without charge
for six month intervals."5 8 The detention order may be renewed if a mili-
tary court judge determines that to formally charge a person would com-
promise sensitive sources of evidence. Consequently, that person may
remain in administrative detention, indefinitely, without charge.2 5 9
"Security" has become a rather arbitrary term, broad enough to ra-
tionalize almost anything, including censorship. For example, publishers
in East Jerusalem (the Arab section) must obtain a license in order to
distribute their publications in the Occupied Territories.260 "A permit
must be obtained for every publication imported into the Occupied Terri-
tories."' 261 In 1984, 1,300 books were banned by the Israeli authorities.
United States country reports note improvement in this area claiming
only 350 books are presently prohibited. Possession of banned materials
is a criminal offense. This charge is invoked regularly as a security
violation.262
Censorship is also imposed regularly on the Arab press, "[a]ll items
254. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 123, at 1188.
255. I d; see Cainker & Abu-Shakrah, A Critique of the U& State Department's 1986 Coun-
try Report on Human Rights Practices in the 1967Israeli-Occupied Palestinian Territories, 18 J.
PALEsTNE STuD. 89 (1987).
256. Id. at 263.
257. Id.
258. 1L SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 228. 1,700 persons were under administrative deten-
tion (i.e. without charge) as of April 1988. In June 1988 the Washington Post reported 2,061
people were being held at Ketziot Center alone. Id at 229.
259. See id at 228.
Before the uprising began on 9 December 1987, about 3000 detainees were under
interrogation, awaiting trial or serving prison sentences for security offenses, which
include membership in a political party, raising the Palestinian flag, and taking part
in a demonstration.... [Miore than 12,000 Palestinians have been detained on secur-
ity grounds since December 1987,... at least 6,000 are still in custody.
Id at 233.
260. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 123, at 1189; see R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at
156-61.
261. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 123, at 1189.
262. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 156-61.
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in Jerusalem's Arabic press must be submitted to the censor for prior
review.... Hebrew newspapers need submit only articles on military
security matters. ' 263 The East Jerusalem Palestinian daily, Al-Fajr is
banned from distribution in the Occupied Territories.264 Yet the 1986
United States State Department Country Report on Israel265 insists
"[f]reedom of expression is generally respected, subject to restrictions
which are deemed by Israeli authorities as necessary on security
grounds. '266 Even when appeal is sought, the Israeli High Court has
affirmed on the basis of security orders which permanently close Arab
newspapers in Jerusalem.267
Freedom of association is also denied the Pale;tinian residents of the
West Bank and Gaza under orders created and executed by the Israeli
military. Meetings or gatherings of more than ten persons require per-
mission from the military authority which is often withheld.268 For ex-
ample, a union office in Nablus was closed for six months while the head
of the office was placed under administrative detention on "security"
grounds.269 No Palestinian political parties are permitted, and Munici-
pal elections were last held in 1976. Very few of those elected have con-
tinued in office; most were dismissed and replaced by Israeli officials.
270
Freedom of movement is another right curtailed by the military on
the basis of security. Travel bans are imposed on persons suspected of,
263. Id.
264. See id. at 156-57.
Military Order No. 50 prohibits the bringing to the area of any "newspapers" or its
"publication" without a permit from the Area Commander.... On August 6, 1980
the order was amended to include... 'any publication which has not been entered in
the list of prohibited publications... shall not be considered a publication permitted
to be brought into or published in the "West Bank" unless a. permit has been issued
for it.'
Id (footnote omitted).
265. Public Law 94-329 requires the United States State Department to prepare annual
reports on the condition of human rights in the countries to which it supplies military or
economic assistance. It is prohibited under this law to give financial aid to "any country the
government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally rec-
ognized human rights." Israel receives the largest amount of economic and military aid of any
country which receives United States foreign assistance. In 1986, Israel received upwards of 5
billion dollars in grants and aid. As detailed above Israel continues the practice of widespread
human rights violations against Palestinians. The Israeli government itself admitted that its
secret police, the Shin Bet, was guilty of using torture as a routine part of interrogation of
Palestinian suspects.
266. CoUNTRY REPORTs, supra note 123, at 1189.
267. Id
268. Id. at 1190.
269. Id.
270. lId at 1192.
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but not charged with, anti-occupation activities.271 This is one method
which Israel uses to prevent Palestinian activists from travelling outside
the country to inform others about the conditions inside the
territorites.272
In more extreme cases Palestinians have been placed under town or
house arrest by the military and are prohibited from movement outside
of a designated area. This happens repeatedly to Arab journalists. 7 3
Palestinians who work in Israel as day laborers must return to the Occu-
pied Territories at night. The security rationale is invoked to prohibit
them from staying outside the Occupied Territories after midnight.274
Students and teachers do not know academic freedom in the Occu-
pied Territories, not only because of Israeli censorship, but also because
Palestinian colleges and universities are frequently closed during the
course of a year for "security" reasons. Even the United States State
Department concluded that "[t]hese measures at times went beyond
what might be reasonably justified on security grounds. ' 275 Currently,
all schools and universities in the West Bank are closed indefinitely.
Thus, the entire student population of 300,000 in the West Bank is pro-
hibited from attending school.276
The following are other bizarre examples of how the Israeli military
has distorted the concept of security so as to interfere with every aspect
of Palestinian life: denial of a permit for the establishment of a needle-
work cooperative supported by the Mennonite Central Committee;' re-
fusal to grant the YWCA permission to establish a center in the West
Bank;2, 8 the prohibition of the picking of za'atar;279 and the prohibition
of the display of the Palestinian flag, its colors (black, white, green, and
red) or Palestinian nationalist slogans.280
The Israeli concept of security is limitless and though security is
mentioned in the Geneva Convention as a legitimate concern of the occu-
pying power, it is used by the Israelis as justification for the restriction
and control of all facets of Palestinian life. A prominent Palestinian
human rights attorney projects that the use of the security rationale is
271. Id at 1191-92.
272. See generally R. TAwIL, MY HOME MY PRISON (1979).
273. Id. at 1179-80; see R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 231.
274. COUNTRY REPORTS, supra note 123, at 1191.
275. Id.
276. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 232 (Military Order of Feb. 3, 1988).
277. Id at 110.
278. Id
279. Wild thyme. Id at 13-14.
280. COuNTRY REPORTS, supra note 123, at 1189.
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only a temporary phenomenon. 28 1 This prediction is based on a recent
decision by the Israeli High Court in which Jewish settlers (the popula-
tion of the occupier) were considered part of the local population within
the meaning of the Fourth Geneva Convention for the protection of civil-
ians.282 Because of this decision, it is predicted tha.t Israel will begin to
justify its actions against the Palestinians in terms of benefitting the "lo-
cal" (Jewish settler) population, rather than the current rationale: to
preserve Israeli security.
As long as the Court considers Jewish settlers to be part of the local
population... the restrictions imposed by the above criteria of interna-
tional law designed to protect the civilian population under occupation
will be distorted. It is to be expected therefore that.., the Court will
be putting less stress on security justifications and more on the benefits
to be derived from the actions of the military by the 'local' popula-
tion.... Legal provisions which have been used to safeguard the inter-
ests of occupied people will be used by the occupier to defend policies
that are being practised to benefit primarily the citizens of the
2813occupier.
The new planning laws already reflect this distortion of international
law. The focus is on the interests of the settlers, rather than those of the
Palestinian population. "From the perspective of 30,000 Israeli settlers,
proper planning and licensing procedures seem to have been carried out
smoothly. From the perspective of 750,000 West Bank Palestinians, the
preamble reads like a macabre joke."28
The pattern which emerges when one considers Israeli practices in
the Occupied Territories is one of deliberate and systematic denial of Pal-
estinian rights. To identify oneself as a Palestinian with national aspira-
tions is a security offense.
The Israeli propaganda machine has sought to portray ... the
Palestinians inside and outside the West Bank as supporters of terror-
ism and as the bitter enemies of Israel, who will never accept Israel's
existence.... This blanket description, or rather caricature, leads to
the harassment of all Palestinians because, being Palestinian, they are
considered a security threat to Israel. The reasoning that underlies the
policy is that to be a Palestinian is to be subversive: to be subversive is
to endanger security.
285
281. P- SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 110-11.
282. The Electric Company for the District of Jerusalem Ltd. v. Minister of Defense et al.,
(1972) P.D. 27(1) 124, 138 F.
283. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 111.
284. Id. (quoting WEST BANK DATA PROJECT 1984, supra note 128, at 28).
285. R. SHEHADEH, supra note 94, at 112.
[Vol. 12
Palestine and Humanitarian Law
To allow Palestinians the full exercise of their human rights would
be tantamount to consenting to the legitimacy of a Palestinian state, or to
granting them full participation within Israeli society-neither of which
Israel is prepared to do. Instead the Israeli government promotes a pol-
icy which aims to displace the Palestinian population with that of Israeli
Jewish settlers.
V. CONCLUSION
It is clearly established by international law and international con-
sensus that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the Israeli military
administration of the Occupied Territories. Israel maintains that it is not
bound, but that the convention is observed de facto. The evidence shows
otherwise, but more importantly should laws which take into account the
exigencies of war thereby allowing the derogation of certain human
rights, remain in effect for more than twenty years? Shouldn't a different
standard govern or develop? The alternative, currently the status quo, is
the prolonged denial of human rights sanctioned by law.
The drafters of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 did not intend their
minimum standards (protection for civilians compromised by war) to be-
come a tool of oppression. Nevertheless, such a situation has resulted
because of the continued failure to arrive at a political solution.
Blame for intransigence has been cast almost exclusively on the
"Arabs." Such a perception mischaracterizes the conflict in two ways.
First, the resolution of this conflict concerns the fate of the Palestinians,
and not the entire Arab World. We should not look to other Arab coun-
tries as peace brokers for Palestinians and Israelis. Secondly, Israel holds
the power in terms of military strength, occupation of land, and domin-
ion over the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. Comparable bar-
gaining power is not shared by the Palestinians, yet their "refusal to
recognize Israel's right to exist" rather than Israel's unwillingness to re-
linquish territory, is so often given as the purported reason for impasse in
negotiations. Ironically, Israel, by all indications, does not recognize the
rights of the Palestinians to exist, or to have a homeland, or to have
representatives of their own choosing. If there must be a precondition to
negotiations, shouldn't it be the one of mutual recognition rather than a
unilateral demand set by Israel? Recently, when Palestinian Liberation
Organization Chairman Yassir Arafat acknowledged before the world
Israel's right to exist, Israel responded with its characteristic refusal to
negotiate.
The United Nations recognizes the P.L.O. as the only legitimate
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representative of the Palestinians. Recently, the United States has
opened dialogue with the P.L.O. after years of refusal to negotiate with
them. These are encouraging signs. Unfortunately, Israel still refuses to
recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and the representative
role of the Palestinian Liberation Organization.
Until Israel is willing to acknowledge the rights of the Palestinians,
including the right to statehood, no genuine resolution will be reached.
Past attempts to negotiate with Egypt and Jordan as proxies have failed
to bring about a resolution. Absent from those negotiations was any le-
gitimate representative for the Palestinians. No negotiations can succeed
if an essential party to the conflict is not included.
In the meantime, resolution of the conflict remains in the distance,
while Israel continues to confiscate more land, displace more Palestini-
ans, and build more settlements. This policy of displacing Palestinians
and establishing a Jewish population in the area promotes an Israeli
agenda of expansion outside the bounds of international law. If Israel's
intentions are to annex the territory, then what is to become of the two
million Palestinians living there? Is Israel going to make them Israeli
citizens with rights equivalent to Israeli Jews? By doing so, Jews will be
a minority in Israel in less than twenty years. The alternative proposed
by some in the Israeli Knesset is to expell the Palestinians, or to continue
military rule until so few Palestinians remain that to make them Israelis
would not threaten the Jewish character of the state. Neither of these
alternatives would be palatable to either the Israelis, the Palestinians or
the international community.
For the past seventeen months, the Palestinians in the Occupied
Territories have taken matters into their own hands by sustaining a level
of mass rebellion and protest against the military occupation. The Pales-
tinians have been very successful in calling attention (causing a noticea-
ble change in United States public opinion 2 6) to a problem which has
been ignored and mischaracterized. Inspite of the ever increasing sacri-
fice of Palestinian lives, the uprising has had a positive effect on the mo-
rale of the Palestinians because they have regaiined a sense of control.
Israel is being forced to confront its future in terms of the Occpied Ter-
ritories. The Palestinian uprising has also impacted the Israeli economy
because shopkeepers are boycotting Israeli products, or are no longer
open for business; thus, fewer Israeli products are sold. In addition, the
Israeli people are seeing the harsh effects of Israel's occupation policies
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and the pitiful battle of stones against bullets. The moral question with
which many Israelis are so uncomfortable, the occupation and oppres-
sion of another people, is being brought to the forefront of debate. The
atmosphere of confrontation may have the effect of motivating both sides
to reach a resolution in the conflict.
The only solution which will endure is one that contains recognition
of the right of self-determination for the Palestinians, and their right to a
homeland. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians have been living with
the hope that one or the other would disappear. History has born out
neither of these results. The Palestinians have had to come to terms with
the permanence of the Israeli State over the past forty years. They have
lived through its establishment and under its rule. The next step is for
Israel to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to have the
same things: to have their own country, and to live free from military
domination. Obviously, time cannot be turned back to rectify all the
wrongs that have been committed but the first step in ending this forty
year conflict must begin by addressing the rights of the Palestinians on an
equal par with the rights of the Israelis.
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